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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LaVAR PARK
Plaintiff and Respondent
-

vs.-

MOORMAN MANUFACTURING
COMPANY,
a corporation
Defendant and appellant

Civil No.
7456

and GAIL BARRON,
Defendant

Brief of Appellant
STATElviENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff in this action is engaged in the chicken
business in Riverton, Utah (R. 120), and the defendant
Moorman Manufacturing Company is a corporation organized in Illinois, and engaged in the business of the manufacture and sale of various feeds for poultry and livestock.
(SeeR. 627 et seq.) The plaintiff alleges in his complaint
that on or about June 9, 1948, defendant Gail Barron
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contacted plaintiff at his residence in Riverton and represented himself to be a salesman for the Moorman Manufacturing Company, and represented further that the
company was selling a protein concentrate for chickens
which would save considerable time, effort and expense
in the feeding of chickens. (R. 1-5) The new feed was
sold under the trade name ((Poultry Mintrate 40". It is
a concentrate intended to be fed with other feeds. (R. 621)
The plaintiff's suit is really based upon three theories.
The first is that plaintiff made a written agreement with
the defendant through its agent guaranteeing certain results through the use of t(Mintrate 40" and the ((self-feed"
method of feeding. The second theory is that of a breach
of express warranties under the Uniform Sales Act. The
third theory is that the defendant breached the implied
warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, as defined
under the Sales Act. The trial court refused recovery
under the first of these three theories because plaintiff
failed in his proof. (Instruction No. 2; R. 79) Recovery was permitted under either or both of the other
two. (Instructions 14, 15 and 16; R. 87-89)
Because one of the theories upon which recovery was
permitted was that of express warranty, the conversations
between Barron and Park are set forth in some detail
under Point I of this brief. In substance they were to the
effect that the Moorman Manufacturing Company was
offering a new feed to save chicken men time and money;
that chickens using this feed would not moult and would
produce not less than 65% and that there had been better
results than that. (R. 126-127) Barron said that the new
feed had been tried numerous times and that it had been
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proved to be the equal or superior of any feed now on the
market. (Ibid)
Two methods of feeding chickens were described in
the testimony. The ((mash" method consists in keeping
mash before the birds at all times, and feeding sera tch
once a day on the floor of the coops. Alfalfa and grit are
often fed also. The ((self-feed" or cafeteria method consists in keeping concentrate and oats or barley before
the birds at all times, with grit or some other form of
calcium, and feeding scratch, grain, wheat or corn on a
limited basis. (R. 624) The scratch is scattered on the
floor of the coops. The testimony is that Barron recommended the ((self-feed" method to Park.
Apparently the plaintiff believed that the ttself-feed"
method was revolutionary in the poultry business. He
stated without hesitation in cross-examination that this
lawsuit is based upon the idea that there is something wrong
with the method. (R. 238, 239)
After the plaintiff had agreed to use the new feed
by this method for part of his chickens, but before any
feed had arrived (R. 135-136), Barron wrote out a
statement on a scratch pad in which he purported to speak
for the Moorman Manufacturing Company. This written
statement is as follows (Exhibit C) :
uit is agreed that the LaVar Park feeds approximately 2850 laying hens in accordance with
the tself-feed' sponsored by the Moorman Manufacturing Company. It is further agreed that in the
event of these birds failing to produce an equal
amount of eggs for the same food costs as his other
hens, now on a different method of feeding, the
Moorman Manufa·cturing Company will reimburse
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Mr. Park the entire amount of the money difference.
In the event of sickness an uninterested veterinary will be secured by Mr. Park and the representative of the Moorman Manufacturing Company, and the cause of the sickness will be determined. In the event that the illness is caused by
the feeding program, the Moorman Manufacturing
Company will reimburse Mr. Park for his loss.
In the event of illness by some other cause the
Moorman Manufacturing Company will not be
responsible.
This agreement is entered into on the 19th of
June, 1948.
Signed-Gail Barron
Moorman Manufacturing Co.
Representative."
The detailed circumstances surrounding the execution of this writing are not here discussed, because in
the first place there was no proof of the kind required
under the first paragraph of the writing, and in the second
place, no veterinary was obtained, as agreed upon. The
document was admitted by the Court on the theory that
it tended to corroborate the plaintiff's testimony as to the
oral representations. (R. 140)
Plaintiff purported to state three causes of action in
his ·Complaint. The First Cause of Action set forth the
statements and representations made by Barron to plaintiff, and then stated that they were untrue; uthat said
feed together with the method of feeding was not as good
or better than feeds now on the market and that by reason
of the false representations and warranties of the defendant
and reliance thereon by the plaintiff, plaintiff was
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damaged. (R. 1-3) The Second Cause of Action stated
that by reason of the false representations and warranties,
plaintiff had lost ccmore than half of 2850 hens which he
originally placed on the ccMintrate 40" through culling
and deaths and as a result thereof will be greatly da~aged
through the loss of egg production in the future", and that
he was damaged in an additional amount as loss of profits.
(R. 3, 4) The Third Cause of Action, which was filed
after the first pre-trial conference pleaded a breach of the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose under
the Sales Act. (R. 39, 30}
Defendant Gail Barron was never served and did not
appear as party to the action, although he testified as one
of the plaintiff's witnesses.
When Park met Barron, the plaintiff was alarmed over
picking in his young chickens; in fact, Barron first sold
him some minerals to stop the picking. This was before
Mintrate was discussed. (R. 179-180)
The conversation concerning the qualities of ccMintrate" occurred around the middle of June, 1948. Soon
after, the plaintiff put 2850 chickens on defendant's feed
and the method of feeding advocated by Barron, and kept
approximately 3500 on the mash method and the kind of
feed he had been using. (R. 142-143) At first he was
satisfied with the results of the Mintrate. (R. 144) In
about three weeks his production on these birds had risen
to approximately 63~ %. (R. 144) At about that time
he began to notice an unusual amount of picking, and his
testimony is that the picking occurred much more severely in the Mintrate pens than in the conventional feed pens.
(R. 146-148) He states that some of the Mintrate
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chickens lost weight and that many of them died, but he
was unable to produce any figures from which could be
ascertained the relative deaths during the months of July,
August and September. He used the feed and feeding
method until approximately August 18th, when it was
discontinued. (R. 148)
From the time of the first picking in his chickensbefore he fed Mintrate-to the time of the trial, a period
in excess of sixteen months, plaintiff never consulted a
veterinary concerning the illness or loss of production in
his flocks. His only evidence as to the cause of the picking, deaths and loss of production in his birds was that
three chicken producers in Salt Lake besides himself testified that they conducted similar operations during the time
involved and comparable numbers of chickens were placed
on their usual diet and feeding program and on the ((selffeed" and t(Mintrate 40" by each of these witnesses. Although none of these witnesses had figures any more reliable than Park, they were permitted to testify in substance and effect that the chickens on the mash program
prospered while the birds on the t(Mintrate" using the
((self-feed" plan became ill.
There was absolutely no testimony by the plaintiff
that tended to show that any deleterious substances were
used in Poultry Mintrate 40, although plaintiff did admit
that the sample of the feed was being tested. All of the
testimony by persons who had had any experience with the
ccself-feed" method was that the method was sound, and
that when it was properly used it gave excellent results.
(See testimony of Dr. Wallace Emslie, R. 495-530; Dr.
C. I. Draper, R. 626-636) The ttself-feed" method was
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extensively tested by a number of state universities, with
the result that it was highly recommended. (See testimony
of plaintiff's witness, Wood, on cross examination, R. 380381, 391-39 3.)
There is likewise nothing in the record from which
the jury could have inferred that the contents of Mintrate
40 are not entirely satisfactory and proper for chickens.
The defendant feed company takes great care in maintaining the proper proportion of ingredients in the feed.
This formula is based upon scientific principles and sound
poultry practice. No witness testified that the ingredients
in the feed are not wholesome and nutritious. All of the
testimony that was produced, in fact, is to the effect that
the feed is entirely proper for chickens, and that it will
sustain and improve laying hens. The plaintiff's testimony
that his chickens ((starved to death" by eating too much
Mintrate and too much oats is absolutely ridiculous.

·~

It is interesting that one of plaintiff's witnesses stated
that he was acquainted with the use of ccMintrate 40" in
the mash method of feeding, but that he had not previously
tried it under the ccSelf-Feed" plan. His testimony was
that under the mash method the feed was successful and
satisfactory. Plaintiff himself said he believed that it
was the feed and combination of the oats that produced
the unfortunate results. (R. 238-239)
At another
place in his testimony plaintiff states that his chickens
starved to death from eating too much oats. (R. 187)
Plaintiff's objections were to the quantity of oats. (R. 239)
It is not contended that the defendant Moorman
Manufacturing Company sold plaintiff any oats. Nor is
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there any evidence to the effect that chickens fed oats
alone would die from starvation. On the contrary, oats is the
best single grain for chickens (See testimony of Emslie,
Draper and Wood, R. 495-530, 626-636, and 380-381,
391-393, respectively).
Some time around the middle of August, 1948, the
defendant company learned that plaintiff was dissatisfied with the results he was obtaining, and it sent its manager of the service department, Roger Mittelberg (sometimes spelled ccMittleberg" in the record), to investigate.
Mr. Mittelberg did not learn that plaintiff had been guaranteed any results or that plaintiff claimed that defendant
was liable for breach of warranty until August 28th. On
this date he saw for the first time the writing heretofore
referred to. He and Park ended their discussion in a very
unfriendly attitude. Mittelberg's testimony was that he
told Park the company was not bound by the writing or
anything that Barron said. (R. 799-801) Park hedges
somewhat on the words used but he testifies that he definitely got the impression that the company did not consider itself liable. (R. 205, 239) At that time plaintiff
had ceased using the feed and was back on the mash
method. (R. 204)
Plaintiff's attempted proof of damages is somewhat
involved, and it will be discussed in more detail under
Point V of this brief. At this place we will say simply
that he hoped to recover not only for loss of chickens
during the time they were fed ccMintrate 40" under the
feeding method indicated right up until the time of the
trial, but in addition thereto he asked for damages on
the theory that the birds which died would have laid a
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certain number of eggs if they had lived, and that he
should be permitted to recover the value of those eggs.
During the spring, summer and fall of 1948, plaintiff's birds were infected with chicken-pox (R. 193, 199),
tracheitis, pullorum, big liver (R. 186) and Newcastle.
(R. 206) All of the diseases ex.cept Newcastle and big liver
were in the chickens before July. Big liver was present
to some extent throughout the entire summer and fall, but
because plaintiff had no expert help with his chickens
nobody was able to say exactly the extent to which the
deaths were contributable to this disease. Newcastle
hit his flocks during the latter part of September and the
early part of October. At this time the birds went into
a moult. Plaintiff was unable to say how many of his
chickens died from picking, how many died from Newcastle, how many were lost from big liver or other
causes. His only counts in fact were at the time he moved
the 2850 across the road, about June 1, 1948, and on
December 4, 1948. (R. 274)
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT NO. I. THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE
CASE TO THE JURY UPON THE THEORY OF EXPRESS WAR-

RANTY.

A. No statement of fact was made to Park such as
constituted an express warranty.

B. Park did not rely on any oral representation.
C. The alleged state1nent of fact submitted to the
jury as a warranty was not proved to be untrue when made.
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POINT NO. II. THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE
JURY TO FIND EITHER (A) THAT BARRON HAD EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY WARRANTY WHATSOEVER CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S FEED, OR (B) THAT
MOORMAN

MANUFACTURING

COMPANY

RATIFIED

ANY

STATEMENT OR WARRANTY MADE BY BARRON, OR (C)
THAT MOORMAN MANUFACTURING COMPANY WAS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE AUTHORITY OF BARRON TO MAKE
ANY STATEMENT OR WARRANTY.

A. There was no express authority to make any statements as warranties; there was no implied authority to
make any such statements inasmuch as the proof by both
plaintiff and defendant is unequivocal and clear that
such statements as are relied on by the plaintiff are unusual
and not customary.

B. Defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company is
not bound by the statements or representations of fact, if
any, of Barron on the theory of ratification.
C. There was no justification for submitting this case
to the jury upon the theory that the Moorman Manufacturing Company is estopped to deny liability for the statements of Ba.rron, or for his authority to make any statements or warranties allegedly on behalf of this defendant.
POINT NO. III. THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
DEFENDANT IS LIABLE IN THE THEORY OF BREACH OF
EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES AS TO THE METHOD OF
FEEDING AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THE FEED ITSELF.
POINT NO. IV. THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY THE INFERENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S
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LOSS, IF HE HAD ANY, WAS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF
THE USE OF EITHER POULTRY MINTRATE

40

OR THE SELF-

FEED METHOD OF FEEDING, OR BOTH.
POINT NO. V.

THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EX-

HIBIT C.
POINT NO. VI.

THE COURT ERRED IN ITS THEORY OF

DAMAGES.

A. The Court erred in permitting recovery based
upon the loss of chickens and, in addition, the loss of profits
from the dead chickens.

B. The evidence with reference to loss of profits was
remote and conjectural. It lacked the definiteness and completeness required by law for proof of this nature of
damages. The Court, therefore erred in permitting the case
to go to the jury upon the theory of loss of profits.
C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof
was prejudicial to defendanfs cause.

D. In instructing upon damages, the Court failed
to take into consideration the intervening causes which the
evidence of the plaintiff shows to have proximately
caused or proximately contributed to the deaths and/or
loss of production, if any, in plaintiff's chickens, and the
Court failed to instruct the jury properly upon the duty
of the plaintiff to minimize his loss.

ARGU:MENT
POINT NO. I
THE COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING THE CASE TO THE JURY
UPON THE THEORY OF EXPRESS WARRANTY.
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The Court instructed the jury that the plaintiff
could recover upon either of two basic theories. (Instruction No. 14; R. 87) The first theory was that of
breach of express warranty. The second theory was that
of breach of an implied warranty of fitness for a particular
purpose. (Instruction No. 18; R. 88, 89) The fallacies
of the second theory are pointed out in the brief under
the heading dealing with proximate causation~ We desire
to point out under the present heading that there is no
basis in law for submitting the case to the jury on the
theory of express warranties under the Sales Act.
The first essential for recovery based upon the theory
of express warranty is that the seller must have made a
statement of fact as distinguished from a statement of
opinion or ccpuffing" or udealers' talk" or predictions or
broken promises. The theory of express warranty in the
law of sales grew out of the theory of fraud in the law of
torts. In both situations, recovery is based upon the
making of a statement of fact, an act in reliance on the
statement, and the falsity of the statement. In this case
neither of these elements was present. There was no
statement of fact, no reliance, and no proof that any
statement made was untrue at the time of its utterance.

A. No statement of fact was made to Park such as
constitutes an express warranty.
The Court's attention is here invited to statements,
according to plaintiff and his witnesses, made by Gail
Barron to Mr. Park as alleged inducements for the sale.
Mr. Park testified: uHe said there would be no moulting
from fifteen or eighteen months over the laying period of
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a chicken, and they would never lay below sixty-five per
cent, and that there had been better results than that; that
one woman was supposed to have got ninety per cent."
In response to the ·question, uwhat did he say about this
particular method of feeding?" Park said, uwell, he said
there were three ways to feed and the number one method
was the easiest, and that is what they recommended mostly
was the number one feeding program." (R. 126, 127)
To the question, uDid he make any other statement concerning this feed during that time?", Park said: uWell,
just that it was a good feed and thought well of, that is
about all."
(R. 128)
Mrs. Park stated the conversation as follows:

ccA. So I walked over to them and he asked me
what I thought of it. I told him I did not know
anything about the mintrate or his feed plan, and
he said:
(Well, Mrs. Park, it is cheaper feed, and it will
stop the pick-outs and blow-outs. It will make
your chickens pay 65 per cent or more, from 10 to
15 months.'
I said: (That is pretty good feed, then.'
He said: (Don't you believe in feeding it?'
I said: (Well, I never decided things like that
for my husband.'
He said: (I will give him a written guaranty'or something of that order. With that conversation
I said: (That is entirely up to him.'
Q. Was anything said about other persons having used this feed and obtained results?
A. Well, he just said they had others use it. He
did not tell me, and I did not bother to ask him."
(R. 512)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
Later Mrs. Park said, ((Well, he was just telling
me how good the feed was, what it was supposed to
do. I believe he did mention moulting." (R. 513)
Gail Barron testified that he told Park:
ccA. I told him what I had been told, and in
addition I had pamphlets-the pamphlets I hold
here, which he read. I explained the method as it
was used. I explained that it did not require having
a grinding machine or mixing machine, because
this method eliminated that, and it did not require
that he buy his mash from commercial sources;
and that in this way, on this plan, he would be able
to feed his birds cheaper. It would cost him less
money.

Q. Did you say anything about the extent of
lay that could be expected from the mintrate birds
of this type?
A. I told him the birds had not laid under 65
per cent. I told him that and made the statement
based on what I had heard-not that I had seen
it personally or knew it personally myself.

Q. Based on whose statement?
A. On Mr. McCullough's statement and Mr.
McArthur's statement.

Q. Did you tell him anything about what he
could expect?
A. That he could expect to get 65 per cent or
better in view of the fact that anyone else using
it did that, and he could expect to get it.

Q. Did you compare this with other feeds?
A. Yes. We discussed-Mr. Park and myself,
we discussed it completely in every detail. We
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spent the biggest part of one day talking about this
feed, in relation to other feeds and other methods.

Q. What did you tell him about this feed in
relation to other methods?
A. That it was simpler, that it was less expensive, that his chickens, if he fed them on this feed,
on the method they described, the chickens would
not moult and that he could expect a 15 months
lay without a moult.

Q. Did you say anything about the manner
of feeding, other than what is stated in the pamphlets?
A. Yes, this manner of feeding makes it easier.

All you do is to fill the hoppers, and you can fill
them clear full, then you don't need to feed the
chickens again till the hoppers are about empty.
You don't have to go into the coops with buckets of
feed."
It is submitted that the statements testified to by
these witnesses, considered as a whole and in their context,
merely constitute ccpu:ffing" or ccdealer's talk" or predictions. Such statements do not furnish a basis for recovery upon the theory of express warranty.
In De Zeeuw v. Fox Chemical Company ( 1920),
189 Iowa. 1195, 179 N. W. 605, the seller of a hog remedy
stated to a prospective purchaser that the remedy would
improve the growth and condition of hogs. Plaintiff
alleged in his complaint that he relied on this statement
as a warranty and that defendant's feed did not improve
the growth and condition of the animals, but, rather,
resulted in their deaths. The trial court declined to direct
a verdict for the defendant, and after the jury had re-
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turned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and a judgment
was entered, defendant appealed. The Supreme Court of
Iowa reversed the trial court's decision, stating in answer
to the argument that the question of warranty was properly submitted to the jury:

uwe find nothing that pleads a warranty or
that would make a jury question of whether such
a plea if made was sustained. The most that appears
is the claim of one who desires to sell a worm powder that its use would be beneficial to certain animals that were then ill or not thriving.
((If on this it may go to the jury whether there
has been a warranty, then the same is true if a
physician expressed an opinion that a certain prescription which he was willing to give to benefit
one who was then ill and it proved that the medicine did not improve his condition. Or if a lawyer
expressed the opinion that he could win a suit, and
that he thought certain defenses or tactics would
bring about that result, and if despite the use of
these tactics the suit failed, it would be for a jury
to say whether, the suit not having been won, there
was or was not a breach of warranty.
uwe decline to hold this to be the state of the
law either on what is a warranty or on what makes
a jury question of alleged warranty."
In Farrows v. Andrews, 69 Ala. 96, a representation
was made by the seller of Guano that it was a good fertilizer. Held, as a matter of law such statement is not
warranty.
In Ross v. Porteous, Mitchell and Braun Company
(1939) 139 Maine 512, 3 Atl. (2d) 650, plaintiff asked
the defendant's sales clerk for a particular brand of dress
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shield. The clerk stated that the brand requested was no
longer stocked but that the defendant had one very
similar which was considered better.
uThe new kind recently marketed was taking
the place of (that one' (the shield asked for) * * *
they have been chemically treated so that they can
be washed and ironed out."
The purchaser brought an action for damages as a
result of inflammation of her skin. The court held that
the statements were merely expressions of opinion, not
of fact, and were not warranties. The Court said that
expressions of opinion, no matter how strong, do not
constitute warranties.
In Micklen Tire Company v. Schultz, 295 Pa. St. 140,
145 Atl. 67, the seller stated, among other things, that tires
had given and should give an average of 3 6% more service
than other good tires. The Court held as a matter of law
that such a statement was not a warranty.
The principle of these cases is applied in the Utah
case of Detroit Vapor Stove Company v. ]. C. W eeter
Lumber Company (1923), 61 Utah 503, 215 Pac. 995.
In this case the seller stated that certain stoves and ovens
were first class and would give first class satisfaction; that
the buyers could not represent them too highly to their
customers; that the sellers would stand by any recommendations concerning the stoves, heaters and ovens as to
their being first class; that they were the best and finest
on the market; that anybody with ordinary intelligence
could operate them successfully, and that the items would
usell like hot cakes", and were far superior to anything
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on the market. The Court held that all of these representations were upuffing" and udealer's talk"-expressions
of opinions and not warranties- as a matter of law. The
principle is universally accepted.
See the following illustrative cases holding that the
described statements are not warranties:

Chalmers v. Harding, 17 LT NS 571, that a reaping
machine would ucut wheat, barley, etc., efficiently; Schroeber v. Trubee, 35 Fed. 652 (C. C. Comm.), that dividends
which had been declared on stock had been earned, and
that the stock account was uall right"; Sleeper v. Wood,
60 Fed. 888, 21 U. S. App. 127, 9 CCA 289 (CCA 1),
that canned corn was of the ubest packing of 1888",
accompanied with ((usual guarantee against swells"; Crosby
v. Emerson, 142 Fed. 713, 74 CCA 45 (CCA 3), a statement by the seller of mining stock in regard to the value
of the property, with prophecies as to the projects of the
company; Bain v. Withey, 107 Ala. 223, 18 So. 217, that a
patented article was ((a valuable and useful improvement";
Pate v. ]. S. McWilliams Auto Co., 193 Ark. 620, 101 S.W.
(2d) 794, that trucks would not consume more gasoline
and oil than trucks traded in; Baldwin v. Daniel, 69 Ga.
782, that a plow would ((sell well in Mississippi"; Towell
v. Gatewood, 3 Ill. 22, 33 Am. Dec. 437, that a bill of
sale described tobacco as ((good, first, and second rate tobacco"; Barrie v. Jerome, 112 Ill. App. 329, that Balzac's
works were ((nice books" that ((children would love to
read"; Shambraugh v. Current, 111 Iowa 121, 82 N. W.
497, and Burnett v. Hensley, 118 Iowa 575, 92 N. W. 678,
a description of animals as ((thoroughbred"; Gaar v. Halverson, 128 Iowa 603, 105 N. W. 108, that an engine was
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((practically as good as new" and was of sufficient power
to drive defendant's machinery; Rowe Mfg. Co. v. CurtisStraub Co., 223 Iowa 858, 273 N. W. 895, that an article
was far superior to others of the kind and would sell itself;
McCullough v. Bales, 125 Kan. 670, 265 P. 1110, that
a cow would calve the following March; Bryant v. Crosby,
40 Me. 9, that ((sheep would shear from 3 to 5 pounds of
wool per head, and that the buyer could pay for sheep by
the wool from the sheep in two years and have wool left";
Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N. E. 107, 2 L.R.A.
473. that a bond was ccan A-1 Bond"; Morley v. Consolidated Mfg. Co., 196 Mass. 257, 81 N. E. 993, that a secondhand automobile had been used as a demonstrator and had
been run about 500 miles; that it was in first-class condition and was all right; Ireland v. Louis K. Liggett Co.
243 Mass. 243, 137 N. E. 371, that cold cream was very
good and very popular; that they sold a great deal of it
and people did not find fault with it; Rosenbush v.
Learned, 242 Mass. 297, 136 N. E. 341, that shoes are
((prime elegant merchandise"; Camden Fire Ins. Co. v.
Peterman, 278 Mich. 615, 270 N. W. 807, that a gasoline
stove was ufool proof"; Stumpp v. Lynbur, 84 N. Y. S.
912, that roses ((were very fine stock"; St. Hubert's Guild
v. Quinn, 64 N.Y. Misc. 336, 118 N.Y.S. 582, that Voltaire's works were ccfit for everybody to read"; WashburnCrosby Co. v. Kindervatter, 147 App. Div. 114, 131
N.Y.S. 871, that flour ushould be as good as any made" and
that the brand defendant had been using uwould not be
in it" with this; Maggiros v. Edson, 164 N.Y.S. 377, that
cheese is of uexcellent quality"; Kirsch v. Benyunes, 174
N.Y.S. 794, 105 N. Y. Misc. 648, that chestnuts were of
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ugood quality"; Harburger v. Stern, 189 N. Y. S. 74
that a suit of clothes would ccwear like iron"; Cash
Register Co. v. Townsend Grocery Store, 137 N. C.
652, 50 S. E. 306, that a cash register ccwould do away
with a bookkeeper"; uthat the books could be kept on
the machine"; uthat the machine could be operated by
a person of ordinary intelligence"; Dieterich v. Bartunek,
38 Ohio App. 46, 175 N. E. 614, that programs from
foreign countries could be received with a radio offered
for sale; ·Gray v. Gurney, etc. Co., 57 S. D. 280, 231
N. W. 940, that a certain seed corn would outyield
any other variety that matures at the same time; that
an agricultural machine would work ttin all kinds of
hay, grain, straw and other grass."
In the case at bar the trial court recognized, in part,
the principle applied by the foregoing cases. At several
places in the instructions it is mentioned that there must
be a statement of fact to constitute a warranty. It is clear
that the court felt that the statement as to 65% production was a statement of fact and that all of the other statements were simply matters of opinion and upuffing".
In Instruction No. 13 the court says:
uThe only oral representation that you may
consider a warranty is the statement that Mintrate
chickens on the self-feed plan had laid no less than
65% production of eggs, if you find from the
evidence that such a statement was made."
In Instruction No. 11 the court said that if the statement was, uthat the feed had been tried numerous times
and it had never had less than 65% egg yield when the
hens were fed Mintrate and in the self-feed manner", such
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a statement would constitute a warranty. To the same
effect are Instructions 9, 10 and 12.
Consideration must be given to the context of the
alleged statement. The sum and substance of Barron's
sales talk was that Mintrate 40 was a good feed; that it
would save money by saving time and producing increased
profits. (R. 128, 512) There is no doubt that such statements as that a purchaser will save money and time, that
it is a good feed, that it is the cheapest and best feed on the
market, are all upuffing", and that they do not constitute
warranties. Detroit Vapor Stove Co. v. J. C. W eeter
Lumber Co., supra, a Utah case, is squarely in point as to
this proposition. The 65% statement, whatever it was, considered in this context certainly must be considered as sales
talk and not as an express warranty.

It is to be noted that the testimony of plaintiff and of
his wife was not to the effect that Barron said there had
never been less than 65% production, but rather that the
feed had been used many times and proved to be successful,
and that chickens using it would produce not less than
65%. Park said the statement was, u* * * they would
never lay below 65 per cent, and that there had been
better results than that; that one woman was supposed to
have got 90 per cent." (R. 127) Mrs. Park's version was,
uit will make your chickens lay 65 per cent, or more"
* * ~-. (R. 512) Barron's testimony as to the conversation
comes somewhat closer to constituting a warranty than
any other evidence, but Barron says in substance that he
told Park that he had heard that birds using the feed and
method had not laid under sixty-five per cent. Certainly
this is not a representation of fact, even considered
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alone. (Record 410.) Perhaps Barron had heard such
statements. He specifically stated to Park that these
representations were ((based on what I had heard-not
that I had seen it personally or knew it personally myself."
(Ibid) Then Barron told Park ((that he could expect to
get sixty-five per cent or better :-.. * * ."
Clearly, considering that these statements were intermingled with matters that without question constitute
mere ((puffing", they do not transcend the realm of
opinion, speculation and sales talk. Park's understanding
at the time was that they were no more.
A statement as to what a feed will do is certainly different from a statement that ·certain results had always
been achieved. It is submitted that, as a matter of law and
under the testimony of these witnesses, especially that of
the plaintiff, and his wife-the two persons most concerned
in the decision-there was no evidence from which the
jury could find that there had been a statement to the
effect that there had never been less than 65% production,
and that the court erroneously permitted this question
to go to the jury in any manner.

B. Park did not rely on any oral representation.
We emphasize at this point that by making the argument that Park did not rely on any oral representaton,
but instead relied upon the written guarantee made by
Barron. Moorman Manufacturing Company does not in
any sense or in any way ratify the writing or the authority
of Barron to bind this company. Barron had no authority
when he made the writing, and nothing that has been
done by this defendant is a ratification of his unwarranted

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

23

act. We merely point out that Park did not in fact rely
upon the oral statements made to him in purchasing the

feed.
Park states unequivocally that the so-called {{written
guarantee" was intended to take the place of the oral
statements. (R. 13 0) In Paragraph 6 of the complaint he
says ttthat on or about the 19th day of June, 1948, the
defendant Gail Barron did contact the plaintiff and at the
request and insistence of the plaintiff did reduce the guarantee to writing, and that said guarantee is as follows,
to-wit: * * *".At the trial the plaintiff insisted that that
was what occurred. (Ibid.; R. 131) Park further testified:
teAt the time I made the purchase, that was on
this written guarantee, that was my whole claim.
If he had not given me the written guarantee, I
would not have bought the feed. It was supposed to
refer to that. If I could have got a written guarantee, I would feed the feed, but if I did not get it I
would not feed it." (R. 133)
He further testified:
ttThen I said: ti can give you a chance to prove
that feed, but I will want it in a written guarantee
form. There will be no talk.' " ( R. 13 5)
In connection with the statement concerning the 65%,
Park was asked on cross-examination:

uQ. Why didn't you buy the mintrate when he
said that? * * *
A. Well, I am hard to sell.

Q. You mean by that that you did not believe
his statement?
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A. It seemed a little out of line, yes.

Q. As a matter of fact, you refused to buy the
mintrate until he gave you a written warranty?
A. Until he promised to give me one, yes.

Q. Did you ask for the written warranty?
A. Yes, sir.

Q. Why?
A. Because verbal warranties are not too good."
(R.l90)
It is perfectly clear that Park did not rely upon the
statement made by Barron but rather upon the written
guarantee. He insisted on its execution from the beginning, and he testified that ((There will be no talk", and he
would not have bought the feed ex,cept for the writing.
Where a representation of fact is alleged as an express
warranty it is clear that the plaintiff must prove that he
relied upon the statement before he can recover. (Williston on Sales, Rev. Ed. Sec. 2 0 6)
Of course, in the ordinary case the buyer need not be
especially concerned with this element of proof, since it
may very often be presumed that he relied upon statements
if they were of a kind which naturally would induce the
purchase of goods. (Ibid.) Here, however, the buyer
expressly states that he did not rely upon them but relied
upon something else, viz: the writing, and that he would
not have made the purchase except for the writing. Since
there was no reliance on the alleged statement, it is
clear that there ,can be no liability upon the theory of
express warranty.
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C. The Alleged Statement of Fact Submitted to the
Jury as a Warranty was not proved to be untrue when
made.
There is a third compelling reason why the .case
should not have gone to the jury on the theory that there is
liability on the theory of an express warranty regarding
65 7o production. The reason is that there was absolutely
no evidence whatever which would permit an inference
that such a statement, if made, was untrue. The Court
recognized in its instructions that a representation of fact
must be proved to be untrue for recovery upon the theory
of express warranty. In Instruction No. 12 it stated:
ulf you find that the defendant made a statement of fact concerning the 65% egg yield based
upon the use of Mintrate and the self-feed plan

and that said statement of fact was untrue*

* *"

And in Instruction No. 9 the jury was told that plaintiff
must be required to prove uthat such statement was false".
In Instruction No. 15 the Court specifically stated that
the plaintiff must prove, uthat the said representation
of the numerous trials produce not less than 6 5% egg
yield was false."
The requirement made by the Court is, of course, a
proper one.
It is elementary that in the law of warranties, as in
the law of fraud, plaintiff must prove the represented
statement of fact to be untrue before recovery can be had.
Blackstone states (3 Blackstone Commentaries, 165):
((The warranties can only reach the things in
being at the time of the warranty made, and not
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the things in futuro; as, that a horse is sound at the
buying of him, not that he will be sound two years
hence."
Professor Williston agrees that when recovery is on a
warranty as a statement of fact, the statement must be
proved to be untrue. (See Williston on Sales, Sec. 211,
Rev. Ed. Vol. 1, P. 548)
The error here complained of is that there is absolutely
no evidence from which the jury could infer that such a
statement, if made, was untrue. There is not a word of
evidence in the entire record from which the jury could
infe,r, even if Gail Barron told Park that no less than 65%
production had ever been attained, that this statement
was not true. No attempt was made to offer any such
evidence; in fact, there is no evidence whatever in the
record as to any results before the time that the alleged
statement was made. That evidence was introduced tending to show several unsuccessful uses after the statement
was made does not tend to show that less than 65% was
attained before the statement.
. Again, the Court's attention is invited to the fact that
chicken raising is a highly precarious and speculative occupation. Chickens die or fail to produce without any
observable cause. Chickens purchased at the same time and
raised under identical conditions, being cared for side by
side in similar groups, often prosper or fail without discernible reason. It is a matter of common knowledge that
such factors as heredity, feed, light, wind and disease
greatly affect chickens.
Mr. Barker's testimony that his use of Mintrate was
successful is clear, convincing and unimpeached. Certainly,
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it cannot be contended that an inference can be made from
the testimony of plaintiff's unsuccessful users, all after
Gail Barron's statement, to the fact which plaintiff was
bound to prove that there were unsuccessful users prior
to the time the statement was made. It is to be noted that
plaintiff had more than a year to get his evidence; that
defendant's feed has been used throughout the United
States, and that he did not produce one witness to testify
that less than 65 production was achieved before June 1,
1948. This element was part of plaintiff's case. It is his
burden to prove it. The complete failure of his evidence
is fatal to the theory of express warranty.
For the reasons, then, that there was no statement of
fact made to the plaintiff, no oral representation was
relied upon by him, and if a statement of fact was made
it was not proved to be true, the Court erred in permitting
the jury to consider the theory of express warranties.

ro

POINT NO. II
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING THE JURY TO FIND
EITHER (a) THAT BARRON HAD EXPRESS OR IMPLIED
AUTHORITY TO MAKE ANY WARRANTY WHATSOEVER CONCERNING DEFENDANT'S FEED, OR (B) THAT MOORMAN
MANUFACTURING COMPANY RATIFIED ANY STATEMENT
OR WARRANTY MADE BY BARRON, OR (c) THAT MOORMAN
MANUFACTURING COMPANY WAS ESTOPPED TO DENY THE
AUTHORITY OF BARRON TO MAKE ANY STATEMENT OR
WARRANTY.

-~

··

Under the Court's instructions, the jury was authorized in finding either that there was express or implied
authority for Barron to warrant defendant's feed, and
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particularly to represent that it had been tried ttnumerous
times and had always produced 65 eggs per one hundred
hens per day", or that the ,company ratified the statements,
if any, made by Barron to Park, or that the company was
estopped to deny the authority of Barron to make any
such statement (see Instructions Nos. I, 2, I 0, II and I5) .
We shall point out that under the facts of this case and the
law applicable to these facts, it was error to submit the
case to the jury on any one of these three possibilities
concerning agency.

(a) There was no express authority to make any statements as warranties; there was no implied authority to
make a.ny such statements inasmuch as the proof by both
plaintiff and defendant is unequivocal and clear that such
statements as are relied on by the plaintiff are unusual
and not customary.
The principle is perfectly clear that express authority
must come in a direct line from the board of directors.
The power to warrant would be delegated through the
officers and appropriate employees to Barron. Plaintiff,
of ,course, proved no resolution of the board. Instead of
starting with the top and working down, plaintiff proved
that Barron had no authority, but that he contacted the
state manager, McArthur. McArthur testified that he
contacted the district manager, McCullough. McCullough
denied that McArthur contacted him, and although McArthur testified that he made a telephone call to McCullough's residence in Idaho, the telephone company records
did not show any such call. (R. 745) There is no question,
however, that the attempt to prove as to authority went no
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further than McCullough. A director and western sales
manager for the area, including Utah, Mr. Claude Holmes,
testified that the board of directors of Moorman Manufacturing Company had never authorized any written or
oral warranties or guarantees, and that there was a company policy to the effect that no such statements or warranties were permitted, and that if any authority were
given by the company to any salesman in Utah, it would
come through him. (R. 611-614)
There is no evidence in the record, except the testimony
of Mr. Holmes, with respect to whether or not any authority was given by the corporation. Certainly his testimony
is unimpeached, and there is nothing from which the jury
could presume that there is any express authority for a
salesman to make the kind of statements made to Park.
Nor was there any implied authority.
The rule is stated as follows in the Restatement of the
Law of Agency, Sec. 63, Comment ((C" on Subsection
( 1) :
((In the absence of a usage or other indication
of the principal's consent to do so, an agent authorized to sell either land or goods is not authorized
to make promises as to the present or future existence of a fact in connection with the sale. If there
is a usage, however, to give a warranty upon the
sale of a particular subject matter, authority to
give such a warranty is ordinarily inferred from
authority to sell, if th~ agent has no notice that the
warranty cannot be performed."
The same section, illustration 2, is as follows:

..·

.-·

up authorizes A to sell a shipment of P's flour
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in State X and vicinity. It is the usage in making
the sales in X to warrant that the flour is sweet and
fresh. A makes the sale toT in X ,warranting (1)
that the flour is sweet and fresh, and (2) that it
will remain fresh and sweet after a voyage in the
tropics. A is authorized to make the first warranty
but not the second."
The law is settled that a principal is not bound by the
acts or statements of his agent when the agreement to sell
is upon unusual terms or conditions, or when the statements made are unusual and not customary in the trade.
Particularly where the evidence shows that there is a
custom not to warrant a particular kind of goods, the
statements of the salesman as to the quality or attributes
of the goods do not bind the principal. Illustrative cases
follow:

In john Stimber & Co. v. Keene, 152 S. W. 661
(Texas), the Court said:
ult is there held (referring to Friedman & Son
v. Kelly, hereafter referred to) that the principal
is not bound by the acts of the agent in agreeing
to sell upon unusual terms on condition, unless it
is shown that such authority is given the agent.
When the sale~man proposes terms or conditions
of payment so unusual as those urged in this case
by the defendants, it may be assumed as a matter
of law that they are not within the apparent scope
of the authority commonly conferred upon and
exercised by travelling salesmen. To agree as a consideration for the purchase of new goods that the
seller will take in payment the unsold portion of an
old stock that had been on hand for nearly a year
would seem at least to be so uncommon an offer
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that the purchaser might well question the authority of the agent to make it. The power to sell personal property does not presumptively carry with it
the power to barter or to take over stock in part
payment. That proposition is so well settled by
authority no citations are necessary."
In Morse v. Illinois Power & Light Corporation, 14
N. E. {2d) 259, 294 Ill. App. 498, an agent of the defendant sold certain stock to plaintiff, and agreed to repurchase
the stock. The Court said:
((However, a mere holding out of an agent as
having authority to sell stock and collect for the
same does not carry with it an implication that he
also possesses authority to make a repurchase agreement or to agree on behalf of his principal that the
money will be returned if the purchaser is not
satisfied with the stock at any time in the future.
An agent who is authorized merely to sell personalty and collect and turn over the money for the
same is not empowered to bind the principal by an
agreement to repurchase the property, which
promise is made by the agent as an inducement to
the consummation of the sale."
The case of Chas. E. Morris & Co. v. Bynum Bros., 93
So. 467, 207 Ala. 541, is concerned specifically with the
power of an agent to bind his principal as to warranties.
The Court quoted 2 Corpus Juris, 605, and stated:
uThe implied power of an agent to warrant
title and guaranty rests upon the necessity and propriety of such warranties in the sale of goods. It
is not, therefore, to be extended to other warranties
of an unusual sort, however impossible the agent
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may find it to make a sale without giving such
warranty."
The alleged warranty was that the plaintiff would take the
clothes off the hands of the defendants at the sale price
in certain situations.
In Beck v. Freund, 117 N. Y. Supp. 193, the Court,
speaking through Judge Lehman, said:
Hit is well settled that an agent has not general
authority merely through his employment as a
salesman to sell goods upon extraordinary terms,
and certainly not to consign goods of his employer
upon such terms as Myers attempted to give here."
The Court then discussed whether a certain telephone conversation was sufficient as ratification under the facts of
the case, and held that it was not.
Similarly, in Tollerton & Warfield Co. v. Gilruth, 112
N. W. 842, 21 S. D. 320, a salesman sold sugar and purportedly executed a secret rebate slip which reduced the
price below the market value when the sugar was purchased. The Court said:
uSuch traveling representatives of wholesale
dealers are usually clothed with power to solicit
sales and take orders at the market value, so when,
as in this case, a reasonable price consistent with
current quotations is prescribed by the wholesaler,
the representative has no authority, implied or
otherwise, to enter into a secret agreement to sell
for less, and the attempt to do so, when considered
with the fact that the private memorandum at variance with the order was signed in his individual
capacity, and did not purport to bind anyone but
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himself, was sufficient to put a purchaser on inquiry."
In Rubin v. As!Uns, 204 N. Y. Supp. 827, 123 Misc.
Rep. 155, the plaintiff sued to recover the agreed purchase
price of certain merchandise consisting of coats. The
defendant resisted payments on the theory that the plaintiff's salesman had told defendant that defendant need not
return these coats but if by the end of the season defendant
had not been able to dispose of them plaintiff would accept
their return. The Court said:
nThis alleged agreement on the part of the
salesman was denied. The authority of the salesman to make such an agreement, assuming that it
was made, was not shown. There was no proof that
plaintiff knew of this alleged agreement, or that
he had in any way ratified it. The right to make
such an agreement is not incidental to a salesman's
selling authority. A salesman has no implied powers
beyond that which is usual and necessary to bring
about the sale. The court erred in charging the
jury that the salesman (being the only person with
whom the transaction was made, any terms agreed
upon between the two were binding; ~· * * that
there is no question of the authority of the salesman. Any agreement made between him and the
defendant was binding.' "

..•

~

In Churchill Grain & Seed Co., Inc. v. Buchman, 197
N.Y. S. 552, 204 App. Div. 30, a carload of oats was sold
by defendant and was to be shipped in June, but it was
in fact not shipped until July 8th. On July 19th the
plaintiff's salesman, one Gusman, called upon the defendant and told him that if he took the car, any loss would
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be taken care of by the plaintiff. Gusman and plaintiff's
treasurer both testified that he had no authority to make
such a statement. The jury, however, found that he had
implied authority. The Court cites 2 Corpus Juris 607,
708, as follows:
((Ordinarily a sales agent is supposed to be employed to contract a sale and has no implied power
once this is done, either to undo or to modify the
contract."
The Court says:
ttl think that is a correct statement of the law
in the absence of any evidence of custom. Here
nothing further appears than that the agent was
empowered to sell at prices named hy the plaintiff.
His statement, made to the defendant long after
the order was taken, that the seller would stand the
loss if the defendant would take in the car and
pay for it, was made entirely without authority,
insofar as the record discloses, and was not binding
on the plaintiff. One dealing with an agent is
bound to inquire as to the extent of his authority
and the burden of proof was upon the defendant
to establish the authority of the agent to make the
agreement that the plaintiff would stand the loss.
There is no evidence in the case which justified
the submission of that question to the jury."
The case of Friedman & Sons v. Kelly, 102 S. W.
1066, 126 Mo. App. 279, contains instructive language:
((This responsibility of the principal for the
acts of his agent, not expressly authorized, is limited, however, to such acts as are within the apparent scope of the authority conferred; that is
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to say, it is implied, of course, that an agent on the
road, such as a traveling salesman, for the sale of
goods to various dealers, has the authority to employ
all necessary and proper means for the accomplishment of the sale which are justified by and consistent with the usages of trade. Or, to state the
proposition in other language, the law presumes,
and those dealing with the agent have the right to
act upon the presumption of law, that the agent is
authorized to sell the goods in the usual manner
and only in the usual manner, and make such contracts thereabout as are reasonable or comport with
the usage and custom of the trade in like undertakings, and it is to this extent, and this extent only,
that an agent may be said as a matter of law to be
acting within the scope of his apparent authority.
Story on Age~cy ( 2d Ed.) Sec. 60; Tiffany on
Agency, Sees. 45-47; Benjamin on Sales (6th Ed.)
Sec. 624; 6 Amer. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.)
224; Wharton on Agency, Sec. 189; Mechem on
Agency, Sees. 350-362; 1 Clark & Skyles on Agency, Sec. 244; Upton v. Suffolk County Mills, 11
Cush. (Mass.) 586, 59 Am. Dec. 163.
ccNow, in keeping with the principles thus
stated, it was determined by our Supreme Court
in Palmer v. Hatch, 46 Mo. 585, that while a traveling salesman on the road, with general authority to
sell whiskies for his principal, had authority to
employ the usual modes and means of accomplishing the sale, and sufficient to warrant the quality
and condition of the whiskey sold, an unusual warranty, such as to warrant against any seizure of
the article for violation of the revenue laws, may
not be included within the limits of the apparent
scope of the authority of such agency. And, so, too,
in Butter v. Dorman, 68 Mo. 298, 30 Am. Rep. 795,
it was held that the authority of an agent selling
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by sample and on credit, but not intrusted with the
possession of the goods to be sold, could not be extended so as to authorize him to bind his principal
by receiving payment for the goods under the doctrine of apparent authority. And so too in Chambers v. Short, 79 Mo. 204, it was adjudged that the
apparent authority of a canvassing agent for the
sale of books by subscription, to be afterwards
delivered, did not include authority to receive payment for such books to be subsequently delivered
and not then in his possession. And likewise the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in Upton v.
Suffolk County Mills, 11 Cush. (Mass.) 586, 59
Am. Dec. 163, adjudged that it was not within
the apparent authority of an agent selling flour
to bind his principal by a warranty that the flour
sold by him on the account of his principal would
keep sweet during a sea voyage, in the absence of
a usage or custom of the business to that effect. As
a correlative of the principle which affixes the
limitation of the rule with respect to the apparent
authority of an agent, as above indicated, there is
another and companion principle which enforces a
reasonable degree of diligence upon those who deal
with the agent in relying upon his apparent rather
than his exp_ress authority to bind the principal; and
that is the person dealing with the agent, although
ever so innocent, will not be permitted to ignore
all the precepts of common sense pointing contrariwise and rely exclusively upon the representations
or promises of the agent, however unreasonable, for
the law with respect to every relation of life not
involving intentional fraud or malice, as we understand it, sets up an ordinarily prudent man as the
standard by which the conduct and affairs of other
men should be governed, and in consonance with
this standard a person dealing with an agent is re-
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quired to act with ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence. Therefore, if the authority which
the traveling salesman assumes to exercise in and
about the consummation of the sale of such goods
is of such an unusual, improbable, and extraordinary character as would be sufficient to place a
reasonably prudent business man in dealing with
him, upon his guard, the party so dealing will not
be justified in disregarding his senses and overlooking the real situation, and thereafter seek to hold
the principal, upon the theory of the agent's apparent authority. Under such circumstances, it is
the duty of the party dealing with the agent to
either refuse to close negotiations with him at all
or first proceed to ascertain from the principal
whether the true scope of his authority is such as
will authorize the extraordinary and unusual contract proposed. The principal last mentioned, not
only comports with the ends of justice sought to
be attained by the established law of principal and
agent, but it is in fact one of the fundamentals of
our entire system of jurisprudence, and is as sound
as the Rock of Ages. 1 Clark & Skyles on Agency,
Sec. 210; Mechem on Agency, Sees. 291-362;
Wharton on Agency, Sec. 13 7; 6 Amer. & Eng.
Ency. Law (2d Ed.) 244, et seq. Mechem on
Agency, 350-362."
The Court then pointed out that the buyer himself
regarded the salesman's proposition as unusual; yet he did
nothing to ascertain his authority. His defense to an action for the price was held invalid.
In Central Commercial Co. v. Lebon, 173 Ill. App. 27,
the Court said:
uThe only authority that is implied from the
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mere fact of agency is cto sell in the usual manner
and only in the usual manner in which the goods
or tl~ings of that sort are sold.' "
See also Ide v. Brody, 156 Ill. App. 479, and George
DeWit.t Shoe Co. v. Adkins, 98 S. E. 209, 83 W.Va. 267.
The principle of these cases is recognized in George B.
Leavitt Co. v. Couturier, 23 Pac. (2d) 1101, 82 Ut. 256,
where Mr. Justice Elias Hansen, speaking for the court,
said:
((The apparent power of an agent is to be determined by the acts of the principal and not by the
acts of the agent; a principal is responsible for the
acts of an agent within the apparent authority
only where the principal himself by his acts or conduct has clothed the agent with the appearance of
authority, and not where the agent's own conduct
has created the apparent authority."
The general rule is clear, and the Utah Supreme Court
has specifically held, that a person dealing with an agent
is bound at his peril to determine the agent's authority.
Dohrmann Hotel Supply Co. v. Beau Brummel, Inc., 99
Utah 188, 103 Pac. (2d) 650.
The case of Royal Seed and Milling Co. v. Thorne
( 1928) 142 Miss. 92, 102 So. 282, stands for the proposition that an agent has no implied authority to warrant
the soundness of animal foods for a given period of time,
especially where the orders are transmitted to the principal
for approval.
The rule that an unusual or extraordinary statement by
a salesman is not within the scope of his employment is
stated by Mechem on Agency, 2nd. Ed., Vol. 1, Pages 63 5,
636, Sec. 889. That the rule is sound in principle appears
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to be uncontradicted in the cases. No reason exists to distinguish between cases where a written warranty is made
and cases where there is an attempt to recover upon an
alleged express warranty as a statement of fact.
A salesman, for example, as a matter of principle,
should be no more able in law to bind his employer by stating to a prospective customer that an automobile will last
for fifty years, or that all automobiles of this kind have
lasted in the past for fifty years, than to give a written
guarantee stating that the company would stand back of
its product and guarantee it lasting fifty years. Under
the provisions of the Sales Act relating to express warranties the seller is no less liable in one situation than the other
if agency is established, assuming, of course, that all the
conditions relating to express warranty are satisfied.
The policy of the law certainly is not, under these circumstances, to penalize an employer by holding him liable
for oral statements of his salesmen when admittedly written warranties of the same tenor and to the same effect
would not be binding upon him. The law which affords
certain protection to purchasers must and does give sanctuary to a seller whose salesmen make extraordinary or unusual statements concerning seller's product.
The importance of these principles as applied to the
case at bar is that here the evidence is uncontradicted on
both sides that the giving of a warranty of any kind by a
feed company is unusual. The plaintiff himself stated that
he has been in the chicken business for eighteen years.
(R. 120) During that time he was engaged in business in
Riverton. On cross-examination he stated that it was
unusual for a feed company to give a written guarantee,
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(R. 190) and that no other feed company has ever given
him an oral guarantee, or written guarantee. (R. 191)
He further testified that during this period of time he
had never heard of any other person receiving an oral or
written guarantee from any other feed company. (R. 191)
One of plaintiff's witnesses was Mr. Earl Wood, a resident
of Salt Lake City, and an employee of General Mills Farm
Service Division. (R. 3 52 et seq.) He has been in field
work for General Mills for ten years. (R. 353) His testimony is that General Mills is one of the largest feed companies in the country. (R. 3 53) He stated upon crossexamination that he has never before seen a guarantee of
the kind Barron allegedly gave Park. (R. 385.)
For the defendant, Mr. Claude Holmes of Quincy,
Illinois, testified that he is an officer and director of the
Moorman Manufacturing Company and that the company
does an annual business in excess of twenty-five million
dollars. He was western sales manager and his terri tory
included everything west of the west half of Nebraska,
South Dakota and North Dakota to the Pacific Coast.
There was no authority given to any agents or employees
of this defendant to make any written or oral guarantees
or warranties of any kind whatsoever. (R. 611-613) Mr.
Holmes is acquainted with the custom of other feed companies in the United States, and stated that as far as he
knows no other company makes such a guarantee or authorizes such warranties as was allegedly made to Park by
Barron in this case.
The fact of the matter is that there is a custom to the
effect that no warranty is given by feed companies. There
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is not a word of evidence in the entire record of this case,
except that giving of warranties of the kind allegedly given
by Barron to Park here is unusual and was unusual during
the period of time in question.
It is therefore clear that Gail Barron had no authority,
express or implied, to make such a representation of fact
as is relied upon by the plaintiff in this action. The law
puts one dealing with an agent on inquiry as to the extent
of the agent's authority. The plaintiff knew at the time
he bought the feed, and at all times prior thereto and subsequent thereto, that Barron was making an unusual kind
of proposition to him. He was bound to ascertain Barron's
authority at his peril, and he was not permitted to rely
upon Barron's statements as to what that authority was.
The statements were made beyond the scope of· Barron's
employment and are therefore not binding upon the defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company.
(b) Defendant Moorman Manufacturing Company is

not bound by the statements or representations of fact, if
any, of Barron on the theory of ratification.

:J

;e:

In Instructions Nos. 10 and 15 the Court in effect
authorized the jury to find for the plaintiff upon the
theory that defendant feed company ratified the statements of Gail Barron. The Court said that if the defendant
company knew of an oral warranty, and thereafter accepted orders for feed or payment for feed without notifying
plaintiff that it did not intend to be bound by the warranty as it was made, then the defendant was bound nevertheless. The Court also stated that if the company accepted any benefit from the sale of mintrate after receiv-
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ing knowledge of the oral warranty, without repudiating
it, then the company was estopped to deny Barron's authority.

It may be that these are correct principles of law in the
abstract, but there was certainly no evidence to justify the
submitting of the case to the jury on this theory in the case
at bar. There is not an iota of evidence in the record, and
in fact there was none produced or offered at the trial,
which as much as suggested that the Moorman Manufacturing Company at any time accepted any benefit from
the Park contract, or any other contract made by Barron.
There is not a word to show that the Park feed was ever
paid for. There is nothing to show the acceptance of any
benefits after the matter came to the attention of the company.
The first time the company had any direct knowledge
of the guarantee allegedly made in this case was when
Roger Mittelberg talked with Barron on August 28th at
the Newhouse Hotel in Salt Lake City. Mittelberg had
been here on July 19th, but at that time neither he nor
Park nor anyone else told him that there was an agreement
of the kind made and claimed for in this action. (R.79779 8) When Barron told Mittelberg of this agreement Mittel berg immediately went out to Park's farm and conferred
with him about the situation. (R. 799) At that time Park
told Mittelberg that Barron had sent a copy to the company. Mittelberg said that was the first he knew of it, and
he was permitted to make a copy. (R.799, 800) At that
time Mittelberg told Park in no uncertain terms directly
and unequivocably that Barron had no authority to make
any such agreement or representation. (R. 800) Subse-
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quently Mittelberg wrote McArthur and told him that
he had no authority to make a guarantee. ( R. 8 0 1)
The plaintiff himself hedges somewhat as to what
Mittelberg told him in this conversation, but he testifies
that he got the impression, because of what Mittelberg
said, that the company was not going to be bound by Barron's actions. (R. 205, 209, 240) The Mittelberg-Park
conversation was on August 28th. Park had discontinued
the feed at that time. (R. 148) In September plaintiff's
counsel wrote to the company and notified it that he was
representing Park in the action that resulted. (R. 240)
Barron himself stated that he never sold any feed after
this Park-Mittelberg conversation. (R. 448)
The subject of ratification by a principal of acts of an
agent is treated in the Restatement of the Law of Agency,
Vol. 1, Chap. 4, Sees. 82 to 104. There is no question that
the whole theory of ratification is built on knowledge by
the principal of the agent's act and his accepting of the
benefits of the act or making some manifestation of consent to it, although the agent originally lacked authorization for it. We believe the principle is sufficiently clear
that no authority need be cited. The plaintiff in this case
proved nothing to justify the submitting of the action
to the jury on ratification theories. The instructions of
the Court, therefore, that the jury could make a finding
that there was ratification were manifestly prejudicial
error.
(c) There was no jus.tification for submitting this

case to the jury upon the theory that the Moorman Manufacturing Company is estopped to deny liability for the
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statements of Ba.rron, or for his authority to make any
statements or warranties allegedly on behalf of this defend.

ant.
Insofar as the basic theory of estoppel is distinguished
from the theory of ratification in agency law the estoppel
idea is that a principal has held an agent out through a
course of dealings so that one dealing with him relied on
his authority to represent the agent in given kinds of transactions. The principal then discharges the agent but fails
to notify persons dealing with him. Under such a situation
it is held that the principal is estopped to deny the agent's
authority.
Under the facts of this case there is absolutely no basis
for submitting to the jury the proposition that defendant
is bound by a theory of estoppel. The Court apparently
intended to submit the estoppel idea in Instruction No. 11,
where it stated that if Barron was given instructions in
sales meetings as to the selling points of the defendant's
feed, and Barron made representations to the plaintiff
along the lines of his instructions, ((and if * * ::- plaintiff
purchased the feed because of said statements and reliance
thereon, then you are informed that the defendant company is estopped to deny the agent's authority and is bound
by the representation." It is submitted that the doctrine
of estoppel has absolutely no basis whatsoever on this set
of facts.
The Court also refers to estoppel in Instruction No.
10. There is no situation here that justifies the jury to
consider the estoppel question. Plaintiff was not induced
to purchase this feed by the defendant's holding the agent
out as his a~thorized representative and then cutting him
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off without notifying the plaintiff. The matter of estoppel should not have been submitted.
The fact is that the Court went out of its way to submit any conceivable hypothesis to the jury whether it was
justified or not. The net effect was to overstress defendant's liability. Insofar as the question of implied authority is involved, it is discussed under subheading (a) of this
heading. Insofar as the question of ratification is involved,
it is discussed under subheading (b).
The Court committed error in telling the jury that the
defendant was guilty of acts which estopped it from denying Barron's authority in this case. The error, moreover,
was not simply a harmless one. It had the tendency toreemphasize and reiterate to the jury that the defendant
was liable on one theory or another. The purpose of instructions is to aid the jury in reaching a proper decision,
not to confuse it. Certainly the question of estoppel here
was not involved, and the submitting of the question
only confused and misled the jury. Certainly it was prejudicial to defendant's rights to have the matter explained
in estoppel terms.
POINT NO. III
THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANT IS
LIABLE IN THE THEORY OF BREACH OF EXPRESS AND IMPLIED WARRANTIES AS TO THE METHOD OF FEEDING AS
DISTINGUISHED FROM THE FEED ITSELF.

. :.

In Instructions Nos. 4, 9, 14 and 15 the Court states
in effect that liability on the warranty idea exists whether
the feed or the method of feeding was the cause of plaintiff's
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unfortunate result. The Court refused to distinguish between the theories of recovery with reference solely to the
feed, and statements made concerning the feed made by
plaintiff and the statement as to the method or procedure
of feeding.
When a method or procedure of conduct is suggested
or recommended, the speaker is liable, if at all, on different
theories than those that arise in the case of the sale of a
chattel.
The Court's attention is invited to the decision in
DeZeeuw v. Fox Chemical Co. (1920), 189 Iowa 1195,
179 N. W. 605, where the Court said:
uif on this it may go to the jury whether there
has been a warranty, then the same is true if a
physician expressed an opinion that a certain prescription which he was willing to give to benefit
one who was then ill and it proved that the medicine did not improve his condition. Or if a lawyer
expressed the opinion that he could win a suit, and
that he thought certain defenses or tactics would
bring about that result, and if despite the use of
these tactics the suit failed, it would be for a jury
to say whether, the suit not having been won, there
was or was not a breach of warranty."
Certainly the advice of a man engaged in a profession
could not possibly precipitate an action unless there were
pleaded and proved the elements of fraud or negligence.
Why, then, would there be any liability if one· who does not
pretend to be giving expert advice makes suggestions as to
procedure?
The matter of warranty as it is concerned in this case
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involves personal property; in fact, the Uniform Sales Act
is applicable only to goods and chattels, and Section 76 of
the Act defines the classes of goods subject to its provisions.
An idea or procedure or method is not subject to the Act.
These are simply intangibles, the only reality of which lies
in their application to physical things. If, therefore,
Mr. Optimistic tells me a way in which I can make a
million dollars and I follow his directions with the result
that I am bankrupt, I am not entitled to recover. Similarly,
if Mr. Efficiency Expert outlines a method of production
which he says will cut operating costs in half, and the
method fails, there can be no breach of warranty.
The law encourages the expression of opinion and
the dissemination of ideas to such a degree that a person
bringing an action upon statements such as these, cannot
hope to recover-certainly not on a warranty theoryeven if it is proved that the idea or method or procedure
recommended is basically unsound.
If, therefore, plaintiff's trouble was caused by the
method suggested by Barron, as distinguished from feed,
there can be no recovery for breach of warranty. The
difference in the theories of liability as to chattels and ideas
is of particular importance in this case, because plaintiff's
own witnesses testified that the method was the cause of
plaintiff's difficulties. Park himself testified that his
theory was that the method of feeding caused the loss, and
that is the theory of this lawsuit. (R. 238-239) Plaintiff
had the feed itself analyzed (R. 238), but no facts whatsoever tended to show either that the feed contains deleterious substances or that the proportion of the contents
are not as represented by the company. There is no proof
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that the contents in the proportions found in the feed are
not proper and beneficial for chickens. The only possibility remaining, if defendant is to be kept in the case at all,
is the method of feeding. Since under plaintiff's theory
the method was the proximate cause, and since there is no
such thing as an express warranty as to methods or other
intangibles, the plaintiff .cannot recover on this theory.
The Court not only submitted the cause to the jury
on the theory that there could be a breach of an express
warranty as to the method, but stated as well that there
was an implied warranty. (See Instructions Nos. 9, 14 and
15; R. 88) What kind of a creature would that be? The
Sales Act admittedly implies certain warranties as to the
sale of goods under certain circumstances, but that warranties could not possibly be implied in the sale or communication of a naked idea-an intangible that has no substance.
Defendant requested an instruction to express this idea, but
his request was refused. (R. 71)

It is submitted that the Court committed gross error
in permitting the .case to go to the jury on these theories.
POINT NO. IV
THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE IS INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY
THE INFERENCE THAT PLAINTIFF'S LOSS, IF HE HAD ANY,
WAS THE PROXIMATE RESULT OF THE USE OF EITHER
POULTRY MINTRATE
FEEDING, OR BOTH.

40

OR THE SELF-FEED METHOD OF

It is, of course, elementary that plaintiff must establish by competent and substantial evidence that his loss
was proximately caused by a violation of duty to him by
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defendant. In the case at bar defendant has insisted
throughout the proceedings that any loss of production
or deaths in plaintiff's chickens was caused by factors other
than defendant's feed and self-feed method. The question
of proximate cause assumes importance in this case because all the witnesses who pretended to know anything
about chickens testified without hesitation that there
are numerous causes of sickness and death in the poultry
business.
Plaintiff's own experience in the six-month period
following March 1, 1948, demonstrates the numerous
hazards he encountered. His chickens had chicken -pox,
tracheitis, pullorum, big liver and Newcastle during this
period of time. In addition, he was concerned about the
picking in his flocks before egg production started. (R.
179, 18 0) In fact, his testimony discloses that the first
thing he bought through Barron was a supply of minerals
to try to stop this picking. (Ibid.)
Plaintiff's other witnesses had similar difficulties.
Dan Damjanovich had Newcastle in his flocks (R. 469,
483, 485); Gail Smith had Newcastle and picking (R.
460). His testimony is that the birds just died. Apparently he did not know what was the matter with them. (Ibid.)
Earl Sorensen testified that his chickens were fed scratch
and oats every day and fed the quantity of mintrate
prescribed and cleaned up all the feed, and yet they starved
to death. (R. 496-8)
Chicken men are constantly threatened by perils and
disease and hereditary factors which are not- easily discernible. One cannot read the testimony of plaintiff's
witness Conta, who had been in the chicken business for
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some thirty years, without realizing that the poultry business is precarious and uncertain and that poultrymen themselves often do not know what causes the difficulties. His
testimony is that chickens in two pens, with similar heredity, fed on the same kind of feed by the same person,
and for all intents and purposes treated the same way, have
very different results. One pen may prosper, while another
pen may be afflicted with pickouts or disease or may go
into a moult without apparent reason. (R. 341) The
testimony of the plaintiff himself is to the same effect.
(R. 192-193)
Under these circumstances, in considering the uncertainties involved, and especially considering the lack
of proof in the case, the question of proximate cause
deserves serious consideration.
Consideration should be given to the fact that plaintiff was well pleased with the early results. Egg production
went up to 63Yz% in the mintrate pens. (R. 147) The
important fact is there was picking in his flocks before he
used the mintrate and self-feed method. (R. 179-180)
Plaintiff did not have a veterinary examine the birds at any
time, even though he consulted counsel as early as September, 1948, and kept the chickens for more than a year
after that time. Plaintiff produced no expert testimony
of any kind. There is nothing from which the jury could
infer that the self-feed method is not basically sound.
There is nothing from which it could infer that there is
any deleterious substance in defendant's feed, or that the
substances in the proportions named and guaranteed by
defendant are not nutritional. Plaintiff, in fact, reduces
his own position to an absurdity when he testifies in effect
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that despite the fact these chickens ate the mintrate, ate
the oats and scratch placed before them in the proportions
named, and had oats before them at all times, they starved
to death. Certainly evidence of this kind does not reach
the dignity of competent, substantial evidence such as
justifies recovery. The mere fact that an event occurs
after another event does not mean that the one was the
proximate cause of the other.
Plaintiff's position is almost as ridiculous as that of
the man who decided he was going to try an experiment to
see what it was that was making him get drunk. The man
mixed rye and soda, then Scotch and soda, then Bourbon
and soda, then a blend and soda, and each time the man
became precariously inebriated. He decided that since
soda was present in each of the combinations, it was the
soda that made him drunk.
If this appears to be facetious, it is nevertheless submitted that there is no more scientific proof by the plaintiff in this action. Neither on principles of inductive nor
deductive logic can plaintiff be heard to say that his evidence is sufficient.
Only three other chicken raisers besides plaintiff testified in this case as to results obtained. These are Dan
Damjanovich, H. Gail Smith and Earl Sorensen. It is
important to notice the kind of statements made by these
men on the witness stand. They all testified only that
they followed defendant's directions in using the feed.
Some of them could not remember what the directions
were without being prompted. There is annexed hereto
a chart comparing the pertinent parts of the testimony of
these witnesses with respect to the time after the use when
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Witness

LaVar
Park

Dan
Dam jan~
ovich

H. Gail
Smith

Length
of time
used

Size of
coops
or pens

Number
of
Birds

2 months
& 10 days

(R 148)

various

2850

Other
diseases
in flocks
during
period

Symptoms
complained of

pox
tracheitis
Pullorum
big liver
Newcastle

Length of
time used
before
symptoms
appeared

REMARKS

picking
loss of weight
loss of pro~
duction
(R 148)

about 30
days
(R 148)

These hens got up to 63Yz%
production (R 147). There was
picking in his flocks before he
used mintrate (R 179, 180).
Park says the chickens of his
that starved to death from eat~
ing too much oats had more
flesh on them than the ones that
died from big liver (R 187).

5 days
to 1 week
(R 469)

No evidence as to number of
birds died from Newcastle and
number from picking.
No evidence as to whether
stopped dying after stopped
feeding mintrate.

months
(R 468)

20 X 32
(R 462)

Newcastle
(R 476)
hit birds
250
picking
(R 464) 24 days after (R 469, 483)
started
feeding
(R 485)

6 weeks
(R 559)

32 X 20
(R 553)

250
(R 555)

2Yz

Newcastle
(R 560)

pickouts
(R 560)
birds just died

No evidence as to number of
no evidence birds that died from Newcastle
or number from picking.

..

Earl
Sorensen

None
a lot of them
"at that
were pick~outs,
time
and a lot of
650
(R 598),
them simply
(R 588) but had no
starved to
veterinarian
death"
examine
(R 592)

Testified on cross examination
that chickens starved to death
although they were fed scratch
2 months
2 months
No
and oats every day and they
(R 590)
(R 590)
evidence
cleaned it up. (R 596~8). No
evidence on number that alleg~
edly
died.
599)
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a particular result occurred, what the complaint was in
each case, the size of the coops, the length of time that
they used the feed and what damages, if any, were complained of. It is observed that the symptoms of the
chickens involved were not sufficiently parallel to render
the evidence produced on this subject competent in the
Park case. The complaints are not uniform. The symptoms of Park's chickens were different from those of some
of the other users.
Is it fair to permit recovery based on no more trustworthy evidence than this? It may be that if Park came
into court with a hundred witnesses in this area who had
used the feed and method, some importance might be
attached to a uniform result in all of the ·Cases. Certainly
four users of the feed having different but unsatisfactory
results does not justify the inference that the feed or the
method is the proximate cause of the unfortunate situation
complained of. Defendant produced two witnesses who
testified that their results were entirely satisfactory. One
of these, Mr. Alvin Barker, is an eminently successful
poultryman in Salt Lake County. The testimony of these
witnesses was absolutely unimpeached. It is to be noted
that no one besides Park claimed that his chickens lost
weight. Two of the witnesses said there was no more
picking than usual in the mintrate and self-feed pens.
There is no uniformity as to the time between the
beginning of the feeding and the alleged result. In fact,
Park used the feed successfully for three or four weeks and
had his chickens up to nearly 65% production before
picking started. Denton Black used the feed only twenty
or twenty-one days altogether. The dearth of evidence
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as to salient matters is particularly apparent. The record
is convincing that the conclusions of each of the witnesses
as to his own results is unsatisfactory. Not one witness
could say how many birds died over what period of time, or
exactly what his loss of production was per bird. Plaintiff
consulted counsel within a month after he was told by the
company that defendant would not be responsible for his
loss; yet, despite the fact that the lawsuit was tried some
fourteen or fifteen months later, plaintiff never consulted
a veterinarian during the entire period of time. Plaintiff
produced no evidence that there was any deleterious substance in Mintrate 40, or that there was anything in defendant's feed other than the contents and the proportions
appearing on every carton. Plaintiff had the feed tested
by the Utah State Chemist, but the result of the test must
not have helped plaintiff, because they were never given to
the jury.
Is proof of this nature sufficient to justify the inference that the proximate cause of plaintiff's damage, if
he had any, was defendant's feed? The burden is upon
plaintiff to establish proximate causation by competent
evidence. It is submitted that the jury should not be
permitted to speculate. The test is if plaintiff's evidence
is believed, is it sufficient to establish the fact in dispute?
It is pointed out that this is not the ordinary case of
claimed negligence in the manufacture or sale of a particular sack or can or other container of feed, or drink, or
some other commodity. Plaintiff's daim here is not that
he got a bad sack of mintrate, or a bad truckload of mintrate. Plaintiff claims that'there is something wrong with
the mintrate feed, or, in the alternative, that there is
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something wrong with the self-feed method of feeding,
or there is something wrong with the combination of these
two. The method and kind of feeding were on trial.
Of importance is the fact that the defendant feed company has been in the business for fifty years. It has manufactured a concentrate feed since 1934. (R. 620) The
present product, Mintrate 40, has been manufactured
and sold as an approved product since January, 1945.
(R. 620)
The company sells chicken feed throughout the
United States and engages in a considerable amount of research in Illinois and conducts field tests all over the
country. (R. 619-622) The feed fulfills the requirements of the National Research Council (R. 621) , and
the feed was not adopted by the company until it had
been extensively tested. (R. 619-620) In fact, extensive
tests on the self-feed method have been made by defendant
company and by a number of universities, and the method
is recommended by a number of state universities, including
the University of Ohio. Dr. C. I. Draper of the Department of Poultry, Utah State Agricultural College, testified in detail of his experiments concerning the self-feed
or cafeteria style of feeding, and his opinion is that it
can be successfully carried out and that eggs can be successfully produced. (R. 741-756)
After the complaints made by plaintiff and his witnesses to defendant company, the company contacted Mr.
Alvin Barker of Taylorsville, Utah, and at its request he
placed some of his chickens on the defendant's feed and
method to see whether there was anything about the at-
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mospheric or weather conditions in this area which prevented the successful use of the combination. Mr. Barker's
testimony at the trial appears at Pages 830-848 of the record. His experiment was carefully conducted, and the
testimony and records amply demonstrate that the use of
the feed and method was successful. He got good production; the weight of his birds was good, and the mortality was higher in the mash pens than in the Moorman pens.
(See R. 8 3 6-8 3 8) In view of these successful uses and the
unimpeached substantial testimony that the feed was successful, and in view of the fact that plaintiff did not produce any expert testimony as to any deficiency in the food
or method, it certainly seems clear that there is no substantial proof that the feed or method or both was the
cause of plaintiff's difficulties.
While no case can be found on all fours with the case
at bar as to the question of proximate cause, it is worthwhile to examine samples of some analogous decisions.
The general principle of the nature and quality of the
proof required in instances of this kind is discussed in 2
Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 448 et seq., P. 439 seq. Wigmore makes clear the proposition that where the proponent
of proof is attempting to show something stronger than a
mere capacity, that is, rra general or usual tendency, and
has evidenced this by a few instances; here, obviously, an
equal or greater or less number of negative instances, or
perhaps even a single instance, would help to show that no
usual or general tendency could be predicted, and thus
would be practically available to answer the showing made
by the proponent."
Wigmore continues:
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uBut suppose, finally, that the proponent is interested in showing a fair certainty or inevitableness
of effect; here even a single negative instance would
suffice to dispose of his contention. The proponent
cannot claim that an effect is invariably found,
if an instance is shown in which the effect is not
found; for example, where it is claimed that a near
gunshot wound always leaves powde~r-stains, a
single instance will overturn this claim.''
The problem obviously is one of logic. If the major
premise is all apples are red, the proving of one non-red
apple is sufficient to avoid the proposed conclusion.
In Lamb v. Boyles, (1926) 192 N.C. 542, 135 N. E.
464, the plaintiff drank a bottle of beverage described in
the decision as strawberry ale, which was manufactured
by the defendant. Plaintiff was taken ill while drinking
the ale and was confined to bed and suffered some impairment of vision. Defendant's motion for a non-suit
at the end of plaintiff's case was denied, and this ruling was
his chief specification of error on appeal. The Court reversed the trial judge, pointing out that there was no
chemical analysis of the ale and no specific indication of
poisoning. The Court rejected the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
uin the case at bar there is no evidence that any
foreign substance was dis.covered in the ale or in
the bottle. It is too plain for argument that more
than one inference may be drawn from the evidences as to the cause of plaintiff's sickness and
under the circumstances disclosed ~ ~:- ~ it would
be unsafe to permit the plaintiff to avail himself
of the doctrine that the (thing itself speaks'. The
defendant's motion should have been allowed."
4

4
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In Sheffer v. Willoughby (1896), 163 Ill. 518, 45 N.
E. 253, the plaintiff ate some oyster stew at defendant's
restaurant and he became sick while he was eating. The
court held this was insufficient proof to make a prima
facie case.
In Crocker v. Baltimore Dairy Lunch Co., 21 S Mass.
177, 100 N. E. 1078, plaintiff complained of ptomaine
poisoning allegedly .caused by eating food at defendant's
restaurant. The plaintiff introduced no proof other than
that he became ill after eating, and the Court held that
this was insufficient to go to the jury.

lnReesev.Smith, (1937) 9Cal. (2d) 324,70P. (2d)
9 33, the plaintiff became ill while eating sausage. A physi-

cian diagnosed the illness as botulism. The evidence
tended to show that there were maggots in the uncooked
portion of the sausage and that poisoning does not occur
such a short time after eating. Held that the proof failed
to show that the illness was due to unwholesomeness of the
sausage.
In Palmer v. Rosedale Catering Co., ( 1940) La. App.
195 So. 859, the plaintiff did not feel just right a few hours
after eating crab meat. The sea food ((didn't taste just
right" to her. She suffered some intestinal disturbances
and the attending physician found it necessary to remove
her appendix. The physician testified that while the crab
meat was more likely to cause the disturbance than anything else she had eaten, he would not definitely say it was
the cause of the trouble. The Court held that she failed
to establish ( 1) the unwholesomeness of the food, and ( 2)
the proximate cause. (See 130 A.L.R., Pages 625-626)
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It is, of course, clear that mere possibilities leave the
solution of an issue of fact in the field of conjecture. The
following Utah cases stand for the proposition that a jury's
verdict may not be based on testimony showing only possibility, nor on speculation, conjecture or suspicion:

Edwards v. Clark, 83 P. (2d) 1021
Spackman v. Benefit Assoc. of Ry Employees (1939)
97 Utah 91, 89 P. (2d) 490
In the case of Crouch v. National Livestock Remedy
Co. et al. (1928) 205 Iowa 51,217 N. W. 557, the defendant was a seller of hog remedy. The plaintiff buyer sued
the defendant upon the theories of implied and express
warranty and negligence. He introduced evidence over
objection that other farmers and hog raisers used defendant's hog powder. One witness said he used it on 160
hogs and 107 of them died within a period of six months,
and some died as long as six or seven months later. Another
witness said that he fed it to 150 hogs and that some 60
to 80 died from six to eight weeks after the feeding.
The Iowa Supreme Court held this testimony to be inadmissible. The Court said that there was not sufficient
showing of identical conditions, even though all of the
witnesses testified that the directions were followed in
feeding the powder.
ult is also apparent that the evidence as to the
death of the hogs is remote from the claimed cause.
To say that hogs fed at a certain time died csix or
seven months' after the feeding, or cfrom six weeks
to three months' thereafter is to open a door for
speculation and conjecture as to whether there is
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any causal connection between the feeding and the
subsequent death at such a remote period."
Evidence must do more than merely raise a conjecture
or show a possibility. Sumsion v. Streator Smith, Inc.
(1943), 103 Utah 44, 132 P. (2d) 680; Anderson v.
Nixon, 139 P. (2d) 216,104 Utah, 262; Smithv. Industrial
Cmn. (1943) 104 Utah 318, 140 P. (2d) 314.
Where plaintiff's undisputed evidence from which
essential fact is sought to be inferred points with equal
force to two things, only one of which points to defendant's liability, plaintiff must fail. Reid v. San Pedro, L. A.
& S. L. R. R., 39 Utah 617, 118 Pac. 1009; Tremelling v.
Southern Pacific Co., 51 Utah 189, 170 Pac. 80; Peterson
v. Richards, 73 Utah 69, 272 P. 229.
The attention of the Court is again invited to the
facts testified to by the various users of Mintrate 40 on
the self-feed method of production. With reference to
the different symptoms shown by the chickens in each
case, and the length of time following the use of the feed
and the method, the Court's attention is invited again
to the unimpeached testimony of Mr. Barker as to his
eminently successful use of the feed. Certainly it must
be concluded in the action as a matter of law that in view
of the dissimilarity of the results of the witnesses of the
plaintiff, and all of the other factors involved, there was
insufficient proof as a matter of law from which the jury
could infer that any difficulty experienced by the plaintiff
was the proximate result of defendant's feed and/or the
self-feed method.
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POINT NO. V.
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EXHIBIT C.

Exhibit C is the writing which was made by Barron,
in which Barron purports to make certain guarantees concerning the results to be obtained from the use of Mintrate
40 and the self-feed method of feeding it. At the time it
was offered it was admitted ((not to bind the company on
the question of the guaranty," but on the theory that uit
has some value in showing whether or not the oral conversations took place.'' The court stated that it was of the
opinion that it could not bind the company, and the evidence admitted at that time. Defendant made his objection clear that it was not admissible for that purpose, and
that there was no agency or authority for Barron to make
the representations that appear in the writing under any
theory of the case. (R. 139-140) The court admitted the
exhibit and instructed the jury that it was to be considered
only in connection with the oral representations and not
for any other purpose. (Ibid) This exhibit was thereupon
read to the jury. (R. 141) It was before the jury at all
times after ~his incident, and was taken to the jury room
for consideration. In the court's instructions it is specifically pointed out that there could be no recovery under the
provisions of the writing itself. Nevertheless, the exhibit
was before the jury at all times, and was frequently mentioned during the course of the trial.

It is submitted that prejudicial error was committed
in permitting the jury to consider this exhibit.
The law concerning the lack of authority of Barron in
making and executing the exhibit has been fully discussed
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under Point II of this brief. The court itself specifically
points out in the instruction that the plaintiff could not
recover under the written instrument. The writing therefore was before the jury at all times, even though under
the trial court's own theory there was absolutely no reason
for the jury to consider it.
Error was committed in its being received in evidence.
The written instrument does not tend in any way or degree
to corroborate the evidence concerning the alleged oral
representations of Barron. The only material statement
of fact concerned the 65% :figure, and nothing in the
writing itself is even remotely connected with this alleged
representation. The contents of the writing do not tend
to corroborate the evidence concerning the oral representations. Even if they did, at no time during the trial
was any authority proved for the execution of the exhibit.
As to Moorman Manufacturing Company, it was and is
immaterial.
The written ((guaranty," although not spelling out any
liability against the defendant, was certainly influential
in plaintiff's recovery. It tended to emphasize the idea
that the defendant was liable one way or another. It emphasized the feeling which permeated the trial that the
judge thought plaintiff should recover on some theory.
It was highly prejudicial and certainly tended to influence
the reaction and decision of the jury.

POINT NO. VI
THE COURT ERRED IN ITS THEORY OF DAMAGES.

A. The Court erred in permitting recovery based upon
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the loss of chickens and, in addition, the loss of profits from
the dead chickens.
In his complaint plaintiff attempted to recover for loss
of profits based on calculated egg loss from the time when
he started feeding mintrate until the time of the trial some
sixteen months later. The trial court held in substance
that he could recover to and including December 9, 1948,
as far as his egg loss was concerned, and to December 4,
1948, as to his bird loss. Not only were plaintiff's damages
after that time speculative under the theories of the trial
court, but a reasonable and prudent poultryman would
have replaced the chickens by that time and thereby minimized his loss.
A basic error in the Court's theory on damages was
that recovery was permitted for the value of dead birds
and culls, and the jury was permitted to find, in addition,
that the plaintiff would have received a certain number
of eggs from the dead chickens and that he would have
made a profit on these eggs. Attention is particularly
directed to the third paragraph of Instruction No. 18,
where the Court says:
ccln determining the amount of damage, you are
instructed that plaintiff is entitled to the value of
the eggs, less the cost of producing the same, that
the dead hens and culls would have laid from the
time of the damage to each hen until plaintiff could
replace it, acting with the speed and diligence of an
ordinary prudent poultryman."
Attention is invited to the whole of Instructions Nos.
17 and 18.
The law is well settled that damages cannot be re-
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covered for the value of animals and also for loss of profits
which the dead animals would have made. The market
value of an animal takes into consideration the potential
profit to be made by the animal for its owner. If beef
is selling for 25c a pound, the value of a one-year-old
steer, weighing a certain number of pounds, can be definitely computed. It certainly would be unrealistic to permit
the owner of the animal to recover its value and as well to
receive an amount as profits that might have been made
had the animal lived to be two years old.
In the case of S. A. Gerrard Co. v. Fricker (1934)
27 P. (2d) 678, 42 Ariz. 503, a colony of bees was destroyed by poison. The owner was permitted to recover the market value of the bees at the time and place
of the loss, plus reasonable expense incurred in his effort
to mitigate the loss, but no recovery was permitted based
on the theory of loss of increase. The decision was reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court on the grounds that
double recovery was contrary to law, and in addition,
highly speculative on the facts. The Court said:
uin addition to the above items of damage,
plaintiff claimed damages by reason of the loss of
increase, fixed at 250 hives. This claim, it seems to
us, is entirely too speculative and uncertain. While
the bee is industrious, dependable and intelligent,
it is short-lived; sixty to ninety days is his allotted
time. The span from October 11th to spring, when
the bee swarms, is greater than the life of the bee.
What colony or how many would have doubled
and swarmed in the following spring is too much of
a guess to be the basis of a claim for damages."
In Miller v. Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co.,
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293 N. W. 4, 228 Iowa 693, an action was brought by an
owner of sheep on an alleged express warranty against the
seller of certain stock powder. The Court said at P. 11,
Northwest Reporter:
uPart 2 of the Instruction allowed damages
based on ascertainable future profits on the dead
animals in addition to their value at the time of the
deaths allowed by part 1. This was erroneous. The
measure of damages for the wrongful destruction
of an animal is its value, less salvage, if any. 3 C.J.S.,
Animals, Section 234; 17 C. J., Damages. Section
185."
The Court says that the measure of damages is the
same as in tort:
((Presumably payment to the injured party of
the value of the animal before death would make
him whole. He would not be entitled to future
profits in addition to present value." (Emphasis
supplied)
The lower court was reversed for failure to instruct
properly as to measure of damages. The editors of Corpus
Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum concur in expressing the
idea that the recovery value of a dead animal is the market
value plus any salvage. It is stated that where the recovery
is for loss of profits from an injured animal, the damage
shall in no case exceed the animal's value. 3 C. J. S.,
Animals, Sec. 234, P. 1345 et seq.; 17 C. J., Damages, Sec.
185, P. 879.
In the case of Chicago B. & Q. R. R. Co. v. Gelvin,
238 Fed. 14, 151 C. C. A. 90, L. R. A. 1917C, 983, the
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plaintiff's cattle were injured through alleged negligence
of the defendant railroad. The Court held that the measure of damages was the difference between the value of
the cattle before and after the alleged injury. The second
headnote from the decision in this case is as follows:
((Sparks escaping from defendant's locomotive
ignited brush and weeds on its right of way, which
fire was communicated to plaintiff's pasture and
meadow land, where it destroyed about 150 acres
of grass and frightened defendant's 391 head of
high-grade fat cattle, which he was feeding for the
market. The cattle stampeded by reason of the
smoke and roar of the fire, and one of them was
killed, and all received bruises, becoming overheated. Thereafter the teeth of the cattle became
sore from eating short grass and weeds raised on the
burnt land, and they would not eat. There was
evidence that, by reason of the soreness of their
teeth and their fright, the cattle did not put on
weight at the customary rate, and that when they
were marketed in Chicago, a city in another state,
they were not heavy enough to bring the top price;
heavy cattle being in demand. Held, that as the
measure of damages for injuries from the fire was
the difference in the value of the cattle immediately
before and after the fire at the place of injury,
evidence that the cattle did not put on weight as
fast as was customary for cattle being so fed, and
that they did not bring the top price because they
were not heavy, was inadmissible, as relating to
speculative matters."
The Court said:
((We think the inquiry as to the probable gain
of these cattle in the event there had been no fire,
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and therefore the probable weight at the time of
their sale in Chicago, in the fall succeeding the fire,
the classification of the cattle as to weight, placing
them in the lighter class, the fact that heavy cattle,
in the fall, at the time of marketing the cattle, were
in better demand, and therefore brought a higher
price at that time and place, without even a suggestion that the heavier cattle were in better demand
than lighter cattle, at the time of the fire, or that
heavier cattle had a greater value, at Maitland,
either before or after the fire, are not proper elements to be considered by the jury in determining
the value of the cattle just prior to the alleged injury and the value just subsequent thereto; the damage being the difference, if any."
These cases are precisely in point with the case at bar.
There is no reason why plaintiff could not have replaced
the dead birds and culls. His only loss then would have
been the value of the birds replaced. The court erred in
permitting the double recovery here allowed, and returned
by the jury, under Instruction Number 18.
B. The evidence with reference to loss of profit was

remote and conjectural. It lacks the definiteness and completeness required by law for proof of this nature of da·mages. The Court, therefore erred in permitting the case
to go to the jury upon the theory of loss of profits.
Throughout the trial there was difficulty experienced
by the plaintiff in proving damage of any kind, and
particularly loss of profits. Evidence of the theory
first submitted by the plaintiff was placed before the
jury during the early part of the trial and requires ap-
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proximately eleven pages of the transcript. (R. pp. 158-168
inclusive) The Court took the motions to strike this evidence and the objections to it under advisement and later
refused to permit the jury to consider the damages submitted at this time because the nature of the proof was
not such that it ,could be understood, and, too, because
the kind of figures and evidence presented was wholly
speculative and conjectural. Various kinds of evidence
concerning damage through loss of profits were presented
upon several other occasions before plaintiff. rested.
The final results of plaintiff's effort to prove damage
for loss of profits were embodied in Exhibit R, which purports to be a summarization of the testimony of John R.
Miller, beginning at Page 528 of the record. The testimony
of Mr. Miller, and also of other witnesses called by the
plaintiff, was that on July 3, 1948, there were three
thousand four hundred ninety -one chickens on the west
side of the road in the coops referred to herein for convenience as non-mintrate ,coops. There were twentyeight hundred fifty birds using mintrate under the selffeed program on the east side of the road. (R. 529)
According to the egg charts of the plaintiff, between the
3rd day of July and the 9th day of December, 1948,
250,156 eggs were laid by the non-mintrate chickens. The
witness computed that 2,850 is 81.6 per cent of 3,491, so
that under plaintiff's theory of the case the mintrate
chickens should have laid 81.6 per cent as many eggs as the
250,156 eggs laid by the chickens west of Redwood Road.
The Court should keep in mind that the defendant
does not admit by adopting these figures of the plaintiff's
that they are by any means correct or accurate, or that
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they were produced as admissible evidence, or that the
evidence qualifies under any exception to the hearsay rule.
The fact is that they are entirely self-serving and hearsay
as to this defendant. However, the trial court admitted
them into the evidence and the jury had no other figures
to consider; so for the purpose of this argument the defendant has no other figures to use.
The product of 81.6% x 250,156 is 204,135 eggs.
This represents, according to plaintiff's theory, the number of eggs that should have been produced by the mintrate
birds had they laid the same number as were produced
by the non-mintrate chickens. (R. 530, 531) Mr. Miller
testified that according to his egg charts the plaintiff
actually received 156,157 eggs from the mintrate birds
during the period of time in question. The difference
between the number of eggs plaintiff says he should have
received, 204,135, and the number he did receive, 156, 157,
is 47,370, or, figuring thirty dozen to a .case, a total of
131.58 cases. (R. 528-533) These figures were duly
objected to by the defendant; the defendant duly made
a motion for a nonsuit and asked the court for a directed
verdict, and also asked the court not to submit the matter
of loss of profits to the jury based upon the idea that the
proof of damages on the theory were insufficient, speculative and erroneous.
Counsel for plaintiff asked Mr. Miller on direct
examination ( R. 53 2) :
((Question by Mr. Rich: Do you know how
much eggs were selling for during the fall of 1948?

..·
/

A. I know approximately what they averaged
during that ti_me.
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Q. What was the average?
MR. McKAY: I object to that as improper, not
showing the market value at any time, no foundation laid for the answer.
THE COURT: Overruled.

Q. What is the average?
A. Fifteen dollars per case."
Based upon this estimate as to the average cost, the
witness was permitted to testify that the amount of plaintiff's damage for loss of profits during the period was
$2,004.00. He then corrected the figure to be $1,974.00.
Later the same witness testified to the same theory and,
correcting his arithmetic in small details, arrived at the
figure of $1,973.40 as the egg loss. (R. 537)
It is pointed out specifically that this figure is based
upon a sale price of eggs at $15.00 per case. It is a well
known and uncontroverted fact that the price of eggs
is extremely speculative. Pullet eggs are not nearly as
valuable as hen eggs, and eggs during the month of October and the latter part of September are much more
valuable than eggs produced in December and the latter
part of November. No direct evidence whatsoever was
offered by the plaintiff as to any specific prices of eggs
during the entire period from July 3rd to December 9th. ·
No evidence was presented as to the fluctuation in the
market. The fact that there was such a change in market
conditions appears affirmatively from plaintiff's own evidence and, in fact, from plaintiff himself. It is submitted, therefore, that the court erroneously permitted the
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figure of $15.00 per case to be used as an average in computing the value of eggs during this period of time.

It appears from the document designated ((Judgment
on Verdict" submitted to the jury, upon which it was to
return its verdict in the case (R. 100), that it was permitted to find under the heading ttFor Loss of Egg Yield"
a total of $1973.70 as damage for the plaintiff. One

striking and important thing about this figure is that it
fails to take into consideration in any manner or degree the
cos.t of feeding the chickens involved during this seven
months period. Recovery is obtained simply for the difference between the number of eggs produced on the west
side of the road and the number of eggs produced on the
east side on a pro rata basis. The essential element in computing loss of profits is to produce evidence, so that the
jury may arrive at a :figure that presents the difference. between the cost of production and the gross sales.

It is not sufficient in this case for the plaintiff to
prove that he should have received 47,3 70 more eggs than
he did receive. For all that appears it may have cost him
two thousand dollars or :five thousand dollars, or more perhaps, to feed the chickens and properly care for them, and
in otherwise managing his flock, to produce the eggs which
give him the sales price, according to his :figures, of
$1973.70. It appears from his testimony and from the
fact that he claims damage for loss of chickens that he
was not feeding as many chickens proportionately on
the east side as he was on the west. How many less were
being fed during that period of time does not appear from
the evidence, but plaintiff's testimony is that at the time
of his count on December 9th or 13th, 1948, he had
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1,318 birds on the Mintrate side out of the original 2850.
This means that during the period of time in which he
claims loss of profit, plaintiff lost in the mintrate pens 1532
birds. We do not know and the plaintiff does not know,
nor did any of the witnesses know, whether these birds
died or were culled during the first week after July 3rd,
or during the first week before December 9th. The point
is that if there had been birds living that would have produced the 47,378 eggs, which he complains were lost, he
would have had to feed more chickens, and he would have
been required to furnish them straw and to have the eggs
cleaned and crated and the birds cared for by a hired man.
None of these costs were taken into consideration in any
manner whatsoever in arriving at a figure for loss of
profits.
It is interesting to see how essential this information
is before it is possible to arrive at a reasonably sound figure.
Plaintiff testified that it cost eight and one-third cents per
week per chicken for feed. (R. 579, 580, 581) It is to
be noted in this connection that Mr. Park does not furnish any details as to what this eight and one-third cents per
week included. It is not clear whether it includes alfalfa,
concentrates or mash and oats, and wheat and scratch, or
whether it includes all feeds of all kinds. Defendant
objected at the time that the figure was used, and still
contends that such an estimate without proof of the details of feed cost is unwarranted as a basis for proof of
damage in a case of this kind. However, using plaintiff's
own estimates, the feed cost for the dead chickens, the
profit from whose production plaintiff is attempting to
recover, would reach an astonishing figure.
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Plaintiff claims that he lost 15 3 2 chickens. If the
figure is divided in half, so that a rough average is obtained
as to the number of chickens he had during the entire period, the figure of 756 is the result. Defendant would like to
have a more exact figure, but despite thorough crossexamination, it is not to be had. Park simply did not
know. There are twenty-three weeks from July 3rd to
December 9th, and, based on a figure of eight and onethird cents per week per chicken, plaintiff's feed bill
would have been $1462.29 during this period. (Of course,
it may be argued that there were losses of chickens in the
non-mintrate pens and that this basis for computing is not
fair, since it does fail to take into consideration the cost
of production of the non-mintrate birds.) The point,
however, is that there is simply no evidence one way or
another which furnishes any reliable guide to the jury
or to the court in fixing the cost of production for these
birds and the 47,378 eggs which they purportedly would
produce. Moreover, the eight and one-third cents figure
includes only the feed. How much did the plaintiff pay
for his hired help to take care of the chickens and gather
the eggs? How much did he pay for straw? What were
his overhead costs, including gasoline, car upkeep, lights~
water, building repair, rent, depreciation and maintenance?
There is not one iota of evidence in the record as to any of
these items. Certainly, it cost plaintiff something to be in
the chicken business as a matter of overhead and operating
expense. If the plaintiff could have been fortunate enough
to raise a flock of chickens without any deaths or culls, he
would have had some expenses in producing the number
of eggs claimed. What were those expenses?
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Defendant submits that gross error was committed
by the court in permitting the jury to return a verdict
awarding damages to plaintiff in the amount of $1973.70,
or any other amount, in the absence of proof of these items.
The law is clear that in situations where damages
for loss of profits is recoverable, proof of such damage
must be made clear and convincing and must transcend
the realm of conjecture and speculation. The very term
uprofits" suggests something more than gross sales. It is
for this reason that the law does not permit damage of this
kind for a new business or enterprise.
This defendant does not contend that loss of profits
is not in a proper case and with proper proof a correct
theory of damages. The more recent cases support the
proposition that loss of profits may in certain situations
be recoverable. What is contended is that the proof in the
case at bar lacks such definiteness and certainty as is required in proof of such damages. While no citation of
authority is required, perhaps, for the notion that profits
is a different thing as a matter of law from gross sales, the
court's attention is invited to the line of cases holding
uthat prospective profits of a new non-industrial business,
or one merely in contemplation, are too uncertain and
speculative to form a basis for recovery, for the reason that
there are no facts extant (provable data of past business),
as in the ,case of an existing or established business, from
which the amount of such profits may be established with
reasonable certainty." 99 A.L.R. 938.
The editor of this A.L.R. Annotation points out
that the line is drawn between cases where past experience
provided proof with reference to costs and gross sales,
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whereas, new businesses are unable to produce such proof,
and, therefore, prospective profits from new enterprises
were not considered sufficiently certain and definite to
justify recovery. The cases along this line follow the
reasoning of such decisions as Ellerson v. Grove ( 19 30)
C.C.A. 4th, 44 Fed. (2d) 493, where the court said:
nHe who is prevented from embarking in a
new business can recover no profits because there
are no provable data of past business on which the
fact of anticipated profits would have been realized can be legally deduced."
This principle and the cases which follow it are distinguished from such cases as National Soda Products Co.
v. City of Los Angeles, et al., Supreme Court of California
(1943), 143 P. (2d) 12, 23 Cal. (2d) 193.
These cases are only intended as illustrations of the
somewhat obvious principle that cost must certainly be
proved with reasonable certainty based on past experience
if loss of profits is to be computed as a measure of damages.
The cases appearing in the annotation at 99 A.L.R. 938 are
all to this effect.
In the case at bar the plaintiff was admittedly an experienced chicken raiser in the sense that he had or should
have had in his possession records of costs of operation,
including feeding costs, labor expenses, depreciation, rent,
cost of light and car expense, and matters of that kind.
He put into evidence none of these records, and he testified as to none of them himself. The only evidence which
he presented, and which was received by the court, was
as heretofore pointed out-his estimate based upon these
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records that the cost of feed was eight and one-third cents
per chicken per week. Plaintiff was not qualified as a bookkeeper or accountant, and the introduction of this estimate
by him, based upon records which were not in evidence,
was manifestly and clearly error. It is impossible to determine what kind of feeds were included and, of course,
it is therefore impossible to determine what weight, if any,
should be given to the testimony.
Moreover, the period of time used in making the
estimate is not shown. It is impossible to tell from the
estimate itself whether an entire year is figured, including
the time during which a chicken admittedly does not produce any eggs, or whether the period of time is based upon
the lifetime of a chicken, or whether it is based upon the
laying period, or whether the figure represents the amount
that is to be fed to white leghorn chi.ckens, or some other
kind. Moreover, as heretofore pointed out, there is no
proof of any other overhead.
It is a matter of common knowledge that eggs must
be gathered and cleaned before they are ready for sale;
that chickens must be fed and watered; that coops must be
cleaned and kept in repair. Ordinary business experience
is sufficient for the assertion that there are overhead and
management costs that must be taken into consideration.
None of these figures were put into evidence in any manner
whatsoever, and even the evidence as to the feed costs,
which was improperly in evidence, was used to compute
the loss of profits. The conclusion from the jury's verdict
is inescapable that the jury did not .consider any of these
matters in arriving at its verdict.
It is submitted that under the facts of this case and
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the applicable legal principles, the court should have held
as a matter of law that evidence of loss of profits was insufficient to go to the jury, and that the instructions permitting recovery based upon this theory were clearly
erroneous.

C. The procedure in the trial with respect to proof
was prejudicial to defendant's cause.
Plaintiff had great difficulty in proving damages in
this case. The first effort consumes approximately eleven
pages in the record. (R. 159-168), and the facts and
figures are so unintelligible, vague and uncertain that all
of defendant's objections to the evidence were taken under
advisement. (R. 167) The court decided that such evidence was insufficient and required further proof. However, all of plaintiff's figures were left on the blackboard
and remained there for a period of approximately one week
during the course of the trial. (See R. 8 57) . The photograph of the figures appears in the :files; Exhibit 42 and
43).
The second effort to prove damages was made by having defendant's hired man, John A. Miller, testify. Mr.
Miller made further speculations and estimates without
being requested to produce the source of his costs and estimates, all of which testimony was over the objection of the
defendant. (SeeR. 527, 535, 536, 552)
When plaintiff presented his case the first time the
Court recognized that there was no adequate evidence
concerning damages, and he thereupon permitted the plaintiff to reopen and introduce further evidence. At one
time during the testimony of Miller the Court mentioned
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to counsel for plaintiff that he had given counsel a certain
figure, and .counsel for plaintiff in the presence of the
jury commented upon having received figures on the
amount of damages from the Court. (R. 529, 530) This
conduct was highly prejudicial and gave the jury the impression that the Court was working with plaintiff in
computing and assessing damages against the defendant.
The day after this occurrence in court, the trial judge
commented to the jury upon the statements made the day
before, and explained that plaintiff had a right to have
his theory of damages presented to the jury. (SeeR. 538541) This comment had the further effect of emphasizing
to the jury that plaintiff was entitled to damages, rather
than helping the situation. Under the circumstances here
the Court's comments only emphasized and reiterated its
conduct of the day before.
After all of the trial, and even after counsel for both
sides had argued their cases to the jury, the Court, before
dismissing it for deliberation, invited the jury's attention
to the exhibit of plaintiff, which computed damages and
gave further instructions on the question of damages.
(R. 859, 860) Coming at this time, and in view of the
previous occurrences and actions of counsel and the Court
with reference to damages, this was an extremely unfair
and prejudicial kind of procedure.
It is recognized that the conduct of the trial in general
is in the sound discretion of the trial court. It may be that
the Court did not intend to over-emphasize damages by its
repeated and consistent help to plaintiff's counsel in and
out of the presence of the jury. The fact is that the matter
was handled in such a manner and at such times that it
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could not help but be prejudicial. In so conducting itself,
the Court abused its discretion.

D. In instructing upon damages, the Court failed to
take into consideration the intervening causes which the
evidence of the plaintiff shows to have proximately caused
or approximately contributed to the deaths and/or loss of
production, if any, in plaintiff's chickens, and the Court
failed to instruct the jury properly upon the duty of the
plaintiff to minimize his loss.

.•.

......

; ..·

The subject of proximate cause as it relates to the facts
in the present case is argued in some detail elsewhere in
this brief. We point out at this time only that the subject
is important and has far-reaching consequences insofar
as the measure of damages is concerned. The plaintiff
used Mintrate 40 and the self-feed method of feeding
chickens for a period of approximately six weeks. As
stated elsewhere in this brief, there is probably no proof
of any kind that either the food or the method impairs
the health or laying ability of white leghorn hens, or of
any other chicken. Even if we should assume, however,
that the health or laying ability was impaired in some degree by the use of the feed or the method, the evidence
discloses that many other factors contributed to any loss
which plaintiff had during the time from the middle of
June until the middle of December, during which period
the plaintiff was permitted to recover damages, both for
death losses and production loss.
It is admitted both by the plaintiff himself and by all
of the witnesses who purported to know anything whatsoever about the chicken business, that the business is highly

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

80
precarious and that chickens die at a rapid rate or go off
production for causes which are unknown to the poultry
man. Mr. Conta, for example, testified that in his twenty
or thirty years in the chicken business, chickens in one
coop on the same poultry farm as another coop would die
or go off in production when no other coop was affected,
the feed being the same and the chickens having precisely
the same care and raised under the same conditions. That
being so, it is particularly important to consider the questions of intervening causes,-particularly diseases that got
into the plaintiff's chickens during the period of time in
question.
Plaintiff and Mr. John Miller, the hired man of the
plaintiff, testified that during the last part of September
and the fore part of October, 1948, Newcastle disease
became prevalent in plaintiff's chickens on both sides of
the road. Both of these witnesses testified that their observation was that the disease hit somewhat more heavily
on the mintrate side than on the non-mintrate birds, but
neither had kept any record as to deaths or culls, and neither could testify as to what extent the disease was more
prevalent in the mintrate coops. The fact that this disease
hit the flocks is the important consideration. Heavy loss
resulted and the chickens went into a moult. It is elementary that a person liable either in contract or tort is not
liable for damage which results from an intervening cause.
Certainly a disease of this kind is not foreseeable in a legal
sense, and this disease in September must be considered as
an intervening cause as a matter of law. Instead of so instructing the jury, the court permitted recovery based
upon both death and loss of production and culls until the
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middle of December. It is submitted that on the basis of
the evidence and the record, no jury could be expected to
determine fairly and with a reasonable degree of accuracy
what portion of the loss in the mintrate coops was due to
Newcastle disease, and what portion, if any, was due to
dietary deficiency, if any, in these birds, as a result of a
breach of duty by defendant.
Another factor that is of importance in considering
the question of intervening cause is the picking that was
present as early as the middle of May or the first part of
June, when Gail Barron first talked with the plaintiff,
and which continued, according to plaintiff's testimony,
throughout the summer months, and was particularly
active in the flocks and apparent around the 24th of July.
Picking occurs in chicken flocks for various and sometimes
undetermined reasons. It can hardly be claimed, and was
not seriously claimed by the plaintiff in this case, that
picking in his flocks was a proximate result or even contributed to by Mintrate 40 or the self-feed method. Plaintiff did not testify and did not produce any evidence of
any kind with respect to the question of what portion of
his loss in birds and what portion of the resulting egg loss
was due to picking. The Court's instructions did not aid
the jury in any way in making a determination of the
allocation of this kind of disease or condition. In fact,
the sum total effect of the court's instructions was to permit the jury to lay all of the loss from whatever source
to the feed of the defendant.

It submitted that especially in view of the factors
which play a part in determining the health and productive capacity of chickens, the failure of the court to in-
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struct properly and completely on the principles of intervening .cause was prejudicial and gross error.
One further matter is directed to the attention of the
court in connection with the instructions on damages.
Plaintiff fed the Mintrate 40 and used the self-feed method
of production for approximately six weeks. For the first
three or four weeks, at least, he was able to find nothing
wrong with it. In fact, his testimony is that his chickens
increased in production and the mintrate birds produced
at a higher rate than did the birds on the west side of
Redwood Road. (R. 147)
Sometime between the 24th of July and the 1st of
August, plaintiff decided that his chickens had been made
ill by the use either of the method or the particular kind
of concentrated feed, and he took his chickens off the
feed. The evidence is that in the latter part of August or
the first of September, approximately, the plaintiff consulted an attorney. The plaintiff did not at any time from
the first sickness allegedly noted in his chickens, or the
first undue amount of picking in July until the time of this
lawsuit in the latter part of October, 1948, call in a veterinarian to determine what was wrong with his chickens,
or what could be done to put them back into full production or on a healthy basis. From the beginning, it appears
that plaintiff did everything possible to increase his damage
and basis for his recovery in planning for this lawsuit,
rather than to mitigate his loss. Even the written guarantee
which was introduced into evidence as Exhibit C stated
that in the event of sickness the plaintiff and a representative of Moorman Manufacturing Company would call in
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a disinterested veterinarian to examine the chickens for
illness and determine its cause.
In the face of this agreement, and even though plaintiff had consulted counsel nearly fifteen months before
the action was tried, no veterinarian had ever examined
the chickens. The only thing he did to stop the picking
was to paint the birds with a salve, while debeaking appears
to be the only deterrent. (See testimony of Conta, R.
346) Can plaintiff come into court now and claim that
he took reasonable steps to lessen his loss when he
did not as much as call in an expert to determine the
cause of sickness? Plaintiff did not testify as to one thing
that he did to prevent his own loss, except that he changed
back to the feed he had previously used. He did not at any
time attempt to determine from expert sources what kinds
of feed, if any, might restore the productive capacity or
stop picking.
Moreover, if in July or the first of August, plaintiff
noted that his birds were ill, as a prudent and reasonable
poultry raiser, knowing the propensity of chickens for
easy disturbance in laying and production, and knowing
the ease with which disease is communicated, would not
plaintiff, as a reasonable man, replace his flocks with some
birds that had not been damaged? Of course, it is quite
possible that all of plaintiff's testimony is impeached by
this fact, and that he did not notice anything wrong with
the birds because there was nothing wrong with them,
and that he simply changed feed and is trying ·to recover
from the defendant the natural losses from disease during
these months in his poultry-raising business. But if the
plaintiff's testimony is believed and he noticed something
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wrong with them, and he noticed the loss of production,
could he as a reasonable and prudent man continue to lose
money on these birds and lay the damage to the feed of
Moorman Manufacturing Company? Certainly, the court
should not permit the plaintiff to speculate at the defendant's expense. It is submitted that there was a ready and
available market for chickens for meat during the months
of September and October and August, 1947, and that
the evidence shows that pullets up to five months of age
were available for purchase.
The reasonable position is that if plaintiff is entitled
to recover anything in this action, his damages should be
the difference between the value of his flock after plaintiff stopped using the defendant's feed and the self-feed
method and the value of other birds that could be purchased to replace plaintiff's birds on the open market. If
plaintiff lost ten or twenty days' production as a result
of changing from one flock to another, perhaps this loss
could be recovered. Of course, it must be proved by
competent and reasonably certain evidence.
It is submitted that the theory upon which the question of damages was placed before the jury simply permitted the plaintiff to speculate and did not require him
as a matter of law to mitigate the loss. In this particular, as well as in those heretofore pointed out, defendant submits that the court committed gross and prejudicial and reversible error.
SUMMARY
It is submitted that the court erred in each of the particulars set forth in this brief. Based on the proof submitted
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at the trial, there is no theory in law supported by substantial evidence upon which plaintiff could recover
against this defendant. The court should make an order
setting aside the judgment of the trial court and dismissing
the complaint with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID L. McK.AY
GEORGE M. McMILLAN
McKAY, BURTON, NIELSEN
and RICHARDS
Attorneys for Appellant.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

